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INTRODUCTION
Actions for "reverse passing off"' of goods or services under
section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act have become increasingly popular
as judicial interpretations have revealed the broad potential of this
statute to address many types of misrepresentations involving
goods or services. Before section 43(a) was revised in 1988, most
courts and commentators had readily accepted its broad applica-
tion.2 Although some have questioned or rejected the application
of section 43(a) to reverse passing off, specifically in the context of
copyrightable subject matter (that is, cases involving a false or omit-
ted attribution of authorship),' few, if any, have questioned its ap-
I "Reverse passing off" occurs when a defendant offers the public goods or services
produced by another person, but represents them as the defendant's own goods or ser-
vices. See, e.g., Lipscher v. LRP Pubs., Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 1312 (11th Cir. 2001). The
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION recognizes this cause of action at common
law, noting that an actor may be liable to another
if, in marketing goods or services manufactured, produced or supplied by the
other, the actor makes a representation likely to deceive or mislead prospective
purchasers by causing the mistaken belief that the actor or a third person is the
manufacturer, producer, or supplier of the goods or services if the representa-
tion is to the likely commercial detriment of the other ....
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5 (1995).
Reverse passing off may be "express" - where the defendant places its own origin
indicator on goods produced by someone else - or "implied" - where the defendant omits
the plaintiffs origin indicator but does not substitute its own. See, e.g., Summit Mach. Tool
Mfg. Corp. v. Victor CNC Sys., Inc., 7 F.3d 1434, 1437 (9th Cir. 1993) (express); Scheduled
Airlines Traffic Offices, Inc. v. Objective, Inc., 180 F.3d 583, 591 n.4 (4th Cir. 1999)
(implied).
2 See, e.g., Lamothe v. Ad. Recording Co., 847 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating
that section 43 (a) reaches both goods and services, including motion pictures and musical
compositions); Kasco Corp. v. Gen. Servs., Inc., 905 F. Supp. 29, 33-35 (D. Mass. 1995);
Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255 (9th Cir. 1994); Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 607
(9th Cir. 1981); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Co., 536 F.2d 1210, 1216 (8th Cir.
1976). However, courts have also recognized that the mere removal of origin-identifying
information does not necessarily violate the Lanham Act. Lamothe, 847 F.2d at 1407 n.2; see
also CCS Comm'n Control, Inc. v. Law Enforcement Assoc., Inc., 628 F. Supp. 1457, 1460
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that "removal of [product's] identifying letters and its resale is not
a violation of [section 43(a)] because it 'makes actionable the application of a 'false desig-
nation of origin,' not the removal of a true designation") (internal citation omitted). In
applying a reverse passing off theory under section 43(a) to the replacement of an actor's
name in film credits, the Ninth Circuit has observed that:
[S]uch conduct, like traditional palming off, is wrongful because it involves an
attempt to misappropriate or profit from another's talents and workmanship.
Moreover, in reverse palming off cases, the originator of the misidentified
product is involuntarily deprived of the advertising value of [his] name and the
goodwill that otherwise would stem from public knowledge of the true source
of the satisfactory product. The ultimate purchaser (or viewer) is also deprived
of knowing the true source of the product and may even be deceived into be-
lieving that it comes from a different source.
Smith, 648 F.2d at 607. The rationale for recognizing the common law cause of action for
reverse passing off - protecting the advertising value which the original manufacturer de-
rives when the public can accurately identify that manufacturer as the source of the goods
in question - is discussed in William M. Borchard, Reverse Passing Off- Commercial Robbery or
Permissible Competition?, 67 TRADEMARtK REP. 1 (1977).
3 See, e.g., John T. Cross, Giving Credit Where Credit is Due: Revisiting the Doctrine of Reverse
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Passing Off in Trademark Law, 72 WASH. L. REv. 709-72 (1997); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The
Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire between Copyright and Section 43(a),
77 WASH. L. REV. 985, 1003-25 (2002) (reviewing conflicting law on section 43(a) as source
of a literary attribution right, and concluding that it has only limited utility for this pur-
pose, which would be better achieved through enactment of an express and non-waivable
attribution right for all copyrightable works); Catherine Romero Wright, Reverse Passing
Off: Preventing Healthy Competition, 20 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 785-801 (1997); Lionel
Sobel, The Law of Ideas Revisited, 1 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 9, 31 n.96 (1994) (collecting cases
rejecting application of reverse passing off theory under section 43(a) to claims of misat-
tributed authorship); Brief Amici Curiae of Intellectual Property Law Professors, Dastar
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003) (No. 02-428).
Despite this criticism, many courts have embraced the application of section 43(a) to
claims of reverse passing off arising from misattributed authorship. In Scholastic, Inc. v.
Stouffer, 124 F. Supp. 2d 836 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), the district court held that the post-1988
version of section 43(a) (1) encompassed a "reverse passing off" claim where the alleged
infringers "engaged in passing off [the complaining party's] marks, character names, and
the illustrated likeness of [H]arry Potter as their own." The court relied on Waldman
Publ'g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 781 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that claim for false
designation of origin under the pre-1988 version of section 43(a) "prohibits not only...
the relabeling of a printed work . . . but also the reproduction of a work with a false
representation as to its creator"), as well as a series of Southern District of New York deci-
sions from the 1990's, which recognized reverse passing off claims under section 43(a) (1)
for unauthorized copying of literary works. The Scholastic court noted that "[iin the con-
text of literary works, reverse passing off claims generally consist of the 'misappropriation
of credit properly belonging to the original creator of the work.'" Scholastic, 124 F. Supp.
2d at 843-44 (quoting Waldman, 43 F.3d at 780-81). According to the Scholastic court,
"[t]he harm caused by reverse passing off is that the originator or the product is 'involunta-
rily deprived of the advertising value of its name and of the goodwill that otherwise would
stem from public knowledge of the true source of the [...] product."' 124 F. Supp. 2d at
844 (quoting Rosenfeld v. W.B. Saunders, Division of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 728
F. Supp. 236, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 923 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1990)). As subsequently
interpreted by the district courts, Waldman held that, in the literary context:
A successful reverse passing off claim requires that the claimant establish (i)
that the work at issue originated with the claimant; (ii) that origin of the work
was falsely designated by the defendant; (iii) that the false designation of origin
was likely to cause consumer confusion; and (iv) that the claimant was harmed
by the defendant's false designation of origin.
Scholastic, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 844 (citing Waldman, 43 F.3d at 781-85).
In addition to these requirements, however, in the case of copyrighted works the
district courts following Waldman have also required complaining parties to show more
than mere copying of their work (which would suffice to establish copyright infringement):
Courts of this district have barred Lanham Act claims where the plaintiffs'
trademark allegations merely restate the allegations of their copyright claims,
and in particular, fail to show the "requisite affirmative action of falsely claim-
ing originality beyond that implicit in any allegedly false copyright." In order
for a Lanham Act claim to survive in addition to a copyright claim, "an ag-
grieved author must show more than a violation of the author's protected right
to credit and profit from a creation. The author must make a greater showing
that the designation of origin was false, was harmful, and stemmed from some
affirmative act whereby [the defendant] affirmatively represented itself as the
owner.
Scholastic, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 844-45 (citations omitted) (quoting Weber v. Geffen Records,
Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 458, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Armstrong v. Virgin Records, Ltd., 91 F.
Supp. 2d 628, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that attribution of song authorship to defen-
dant "does not venture beyond that implicit in any allegedly false copyright.").
Other courts, in contrast, have refused to apply section 43(a) to claims alleging misat-
tribution of authorship. See, e.g., Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir.
1984) (holding that "[w]ithout substantial similarity, there can be no claim for reverse
passing off under section 43(a)"), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985); Berkic v. Crichton, 761
F.2d 1289, 1291 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (following Litchfield), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985);
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plication to claims of reverse passing off in other contexts.
Prior to the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 ("TLRA"),'
there was little reason to question whether or not reverse passing
off was encompassed by the language of section 43(a). However,
the language of that section differed significantly from that of the
current version of section 43(a).5 Ever since the TLRA amend-
ments distinguished between false designation of origin claims and
false advertising claims, the more precise language of section 43(a)
no longer clearly includes reverse passing off.6
In 2003, when faced with a reverse passing off claim in the
context of a work of authorship in which the copyright had ex-
pired, the Supreme Court held in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp.7 that section 43(a) did not apply. The plaintiff in
Dastar, Fox Television, filed a complaint alleging reverse passing
off under section 43(a) when the defendant, Dastar, re-edited a
public domain television series originally produced by Fox, and re-
released the modified version under Dastar's name in new packag-
ing that did not credit Fox as the original creator.
The ultimate holding of the case - that section 43(a) cannot
be used to create a quasi-copyright claim in works with respect to
which the statutory copyright has expired8 - is consistent with the
overall federal intellectual property regime, and is arguably consis-
tent with the current language of section 43(a). However, the
Court undertook a surprisingly tortuous path to justify this conclu-
sion. After conceding, with minimal analysis, that reverse passing
off would be cognizable under section 43(a) where the false desig-
Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1364-65 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that, regardless of
substantial similarity between two works, § 43(a) should not apply where copyright law
'provides an adequate remedy"); Kienzle v. Capital Cities/Am. Broad. Co., 774 F. Supp.
432 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (finding no Lanham Act violation where defendant allegedly misap-
propriated plaintiffs idea for a television series); Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker Bros., 529 F.
Supp. 1204, 1219 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affrd without op., 697 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982) (refusing to
apply section 43(a) to reverse passing off claim based on misappropriation of plaintiffs
idea, holding that the Lanham Act applies only to affirmative misrepresentations about the
nature or source" of defendant's goods); see generally Lionel Sobel, The Law of Ideas Revis-
ited, 1 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 9, 31 n.96 (1994) (collecting cases).
Courts recognizing reverse passing off of literary works as false designations of origin
under section 43(a) did not reach a consensus on whether mere failure to identify the
author constituted reverse passing off (in which case the claim was for "implied reverse
passing off") or whether an affirmative misattribution was required ("express reverse pass-
ing off"). Compare Smith, 648 F.2d at 605-07 (containing dictum implying that 43(a) applies
to implied reverse passing off) with Murray Hill Publ'ns, Inc. v. ABC Comm'n, Inc., 264
F.3d 622 (6th Cir. 2001), and Agee v. Paramount Comm'n, Inc., 59 F.3d 317, 327 (2d Cir.
1995) (requiring affirmative misattribution).
4 Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (effective Nov. 16, 1989).
5 See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
7 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
8 Id. at 34.
[Vol. 23:197
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nation of origin misidentified the physical producer of a good, the
Court struggled to explain why Fox's claim - misattributing the
source of intangible intellectual property - fell outside the scope of
section 43 (a), while a claim alleging misattribution of the source of
tangible goods would fall squarely within that section.9 Moreover,
the Court's analysis cast doubt on several applications of section
43(a) that had previously received widespread acceptance in the
federal courts, and arguable acceptance by Congress, including its
application to traditional passing off claims in the context of ex-
pressive works.
Surprisingly, at no point in its analysis of Dastar did the Su-
preme Court question whether section 43(a) applies to reverse
passing off at all. By failing to give adequate attention to this un-
derlying issue, the Court declined an opportunity to provide much
needed clarification on the scope of federal unfair competition
law.
This Article examines the application of section 43(a) to
claims of reverse passing off through the lens of the Supreme
Court's unpersuasive effort in Dastar to exclude a single class of
reverse passing off-claims - those involving "expressive" works as
opposed to physical commodities - from the scope of section
43(a). The Article critiques the Court's analysis of section 43(a) in
light of case law and the pertinent legislative history, including, the
TLRA of 1988,10 the Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1988 ("BCIA")," and the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
("VARA") .12 This history received no attention whatsoever in the
Dastar opinion.
The Article then proposes an alternative analysis which re-
spects the public policy goals of both trademark and copyright law
while eliminating the more problematic aspects of the Court's in-
terpretation of the Lanham Act. Under this approach, tangible
goods and expressive works would be treated alike. In both cases,
affirmatively false or misleading representations of origin would be
actionable under section 43(a), while merely omitted or incom-
plete provenances would be disregarded. As the Article will
demonstrate, this approach is more consistent with the interna-
tional treaty obligations of the United States under the Berne Con-
vention, as well as the historical understanding of the common law
of reverse passing off, as exemplified in the Restatement (Third) of
9 See infra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
10 Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (effective Nov. 16, 1989).
11 Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
12 Pub. L. No. 101-650 (tit. VI), 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
2005]
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Unfair Competition. This approach preserves the application of
section 43(a) to traditional passing off claims in the context of ex-
pressive works, thus ensuring that authors and other creative artists
will continue to enjoy the same rights as other trademark owners -
most importantly, the right to prevent others from using an au-
thor's name and reputation as a marketing tool to attract custom-
ers for works to which the author did not in fact contribute.
I. DASTAR BACKGROUND
After acquiring television rights to Dwight D. Eisenhower's
World War II book, Crusade in Europe, Fox produced a television
series based on the book in 1949. However, Fox failed to renew
that copyright in 1977, at which point the series entered the public
domain. The publisher, Doubleday, in contrast, had renewed its
copyright in the book in 1975. Fox reacquired the television rights
to the book in 1988, including the exclusive right to distribute its
original Crusade television series on video, which it then licensed to
New Line Home Video.
In 1995, however, another player - Dastar - entered the scene.
Dastar made copies of the original Crusade tapes, edited them, re-
tided them World War II Campaigns in Europe, and distributed them
as a videotape set under its own name for a substantially lower
price than New Line's version. Dastar's packaging did not ac-
knowledge Fox's Crusade series as the work from which Campaigns
was derived, and specifically identified several Dastar employees as
the "producers" of the work. Fox and New Line brought suit
against Dastar, alleging that the defendant's video series infringed
their exclusive television rights and, further, that Dastar's failure to
acknowledge that the video set was derived from the Crusade televi-
sion series constituted "reverse passing off" in violation of section
43(a). The gravamen of Fox's complaint was that Dastar marketed
its Campaign series as a Dastar product without acknowledging its
"nearly wholesale reliance" on Fox's Crusade series, and that, there-
fore, Dastar's action violated section 43(a)'s proscription against
making a "false designation of origin" or "false or misleading repre-
sentation of fact" that is "likely to cause confusion . . .as to the
origin . .. of his or her goods."'13
The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs
on all counts. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court on the
Lanham Act claim, finding that the defendants had committed re-
verse passing off by "bodily appropriating" the Crusade television
13 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 28.
[Vol. 23:197
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series without properly attributing it to Fox.1 4
Evidently, the Ninth Circuit viewed its decision as uncon-
troversial - Circuit Judges Kozinski and Gould, and District Judge
Breyer, issued their opinion as an unsigned, unpublished memo-
randum. Relying on familiar Ninth Circuit case law applying sec-
tion 43(a) to claims of reverse passing off, the circuit court
concluded that Dastar's actions constituted a bodily appropriation
of Fox's work of authorship:
Dastar copied substantially the entire Crusade in Europe series
created by Twentieth Century Fox, labeled the resulting product
with a different name and marketed it without attribution to
Fox. Dastar therefore committed a "bodily appropriation" of
Fox's series. Dastar's minimal changes to the series are not suffi-
cient to avoid liability. 15
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court focused on whether sec-
tion 43(a) encompasses claims of reverse passing off with respect to
works of an expressive nature, so as to recognize a claim for "bodily
appropriation" of a work such as Fox's television series.
While the Supreme Court has applied section 43(a) to cases
involving traditional passing off, 6 it has never expressly applied
that provision to reverse passing off. One might therefore have
expected the Dastar Court to begin its analysis by thoroughly exam-
ining this question as a matter of first impression. Instead, with
virtually no analysis, the Court conceded that section 43(a) encom-
passes claims of reverse passing off:
[E]very Circuit to consider the issue found § 43(a) broad
enough to encompass reverse passing off .... The Trademark
Law Revision Act of 1988 made clear that § 43(a) covers origin
of production as well as geographic origin. Its language is amply
inclusive, moreover, of reverse passing off-if indeed it does not
implicitly adopt the unanimous court-of-appeals jurisprudence
14 See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entm't. Distrib., 34 Fed. Appx. 312, 2002
WL 649087 (9th Cir. 2002). The appellate court reversed on the copyright claim, however,
finding an issue of fact as to whether the copyright in Eisenhower's book had been prop-
erly renewed.
15 2002 WL 649087, at *1 (citing Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir.
1994)) (additional citations omitted); see also Summit Mach. Tool Mfg. Corp. v. Victor CNC
Systems, Inc., 7 F.3d 1434, 1436-37 (9th Cir. 1993) (asserting that "[a] defendant may also
be guilty of reverse palming off by selling or offering for sale another's product that has
been modified slightly and then labeled with a different name.").
16 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (applying section
43(a) to a claim that the defendant copied plaintiff's trade dress for clothing); Two Pesos,
Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (applying section 43(a) to the claim that the
defendant copied plaintiff's trade dress for its restaurant).
2005] 203
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on that subject. 17
Based on this unexamined premise, the Court concluded that
if Dastar had in fact purchased copies of New Line's Crusade video
set, and then repackaged and relabeled those tangible objects as a
Dastar product, the plaintiffs' 43(a) claim "would undoubtedly be
sustained."18 By way of analogy, the Court explained that section
43(a) would be violated if Coca-Cola were to pass off Pepsi-Cola as
a Coca-Cola product.19
Having concluded that section 43(a) applies to reverse passing
off of tangible goods, the Court questioned whether the same prin-
ciple should apply here, where the defendant manufactured its
own tapes, and merely reproduced without attribution the intangi-
ble contents of the tapes originally produced by the plaintiffs." ° The
Court concluded that the same principle does not apply, and ac-
cordingly it reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision that Dastar had
violated section 43(a) by its "bodily appropriation" of Fox's work.2 1
In other words, the Court held that while section 43(a) applies to
reverse passing off claims that misrepresent the origin of physical
goods, it does not apply to similar claims that misrepresent the ori-
gin of the intangible contents of expressive goods. Thus, Dastar's
failure to identify Fox as the originator of this public domain work
of authorship did not constitute reverse passing off under section
43(a), because the "origin of goods" encompassed by section 43(a)
does not include the origin of an expressive work:
The dictionary definition of "origin" is "the fact or process of
coming into being from a source," and "that from which any-
thing primarily proceeds; source." And the dictionary definition
of "goods" (as relevant here) is "[w]ares; merchandise." We
think the most natural understanding of the "origin" of
"goods"-the source of wares-is the producer of the tangible
product sold in the marketplace, in this case the physical Cam-
paigns videotape sold by Dastar. The concept might be
17 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 30-31 (citations omitted) (citing Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston
Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 963-964, n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,
691 F.2d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 1982); Arrow United Indus., Inc. v. Hugh Richards, Inc., 678
F.2d 410, 415 (2d Cir. 1982); F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 214
U.S.P.Q 409, 416 (7th Cir. 1982); Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 603 (9th Cir. 1981);
Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Universal Marine Co., 543 F.2d 1107, 1109 (5th Cir.
1976)).
18 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31.
19 Id. at 32. For a critique of this questionable assertion, see infra notes 138-141 and
accompanying text.
20 Id. at 31.
21 Id. at 23. The Supreme Court voted 8-0 to reverse the Ninth Circuit. Justice Breyer
did not participate, because his brother, District Judge Charles R. Breyer, sat by designa-
tion on the Ninth Circuit panel that heard the case.
[Vol. 23:197
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stretched (as it was under the original version of § 43(a)) to in-
clude not only the actual producer, but also the trademark
owner who commissioned or assumed responsibility for ("stood
behind") production of the physical product. But as used in the
Lanham Act, the phrase "origin of goods" is in our view incapable of
connoting the person or entity that originated the ideas or communica-
tions that "goods" embody or contain. Such an extension would not
only stretch the text, but it would be out of accord with the his-
tory and purpose of the Lanham Act and inconsistent with
precedent.
22
The result in Dastar has been relatively uncontroversial, and
understandably so. When a once-copyrighted work enters the pub-
lic domain, the underlying policy of copyright law dictates that the
work should henceforth be free for all to use.23 Therefore, the
party that offers a copy of such a work to the public should have no
obligation to identify its authors or previous copyright owners.
That party performs a valuable service by making the unprotected
work available to the public even after the economic monopoly on
that work has ceased to provide an incentive for doing so. The
party making the work available typically cannot do so without in-
curring an expense - for manufacturing and distributing the cop-
ies - that the party naturally hopes to recoup through a market-
sensitive pricing scheme. That party makes the work available re-
gardless of whether the former copyright owner has any interest in
doing so. At this stage in the life of the work, the party making it
available - either in edited or unaltered form - can accurately
identify itself as the source of that particular copy or version of the
work. A contrary rule would undermine the integrity of the public
domain, by placing restrictions on the freedom of individuals or
businesses to make works accessible to the public. Although per-
sons would still be free to copy public domain works, the require-
ment of proper attribution would constrain their freedom to do so.
This restriction, of unlimited duration, might therefore violate the
22 Id. at 31-32 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DIcrIONARY 1079, 1720-1721 (2d ed. 1949)).
23 The courts have frequently emphasized this policy in patent law. In Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186 (2003), the Supreme Court noted that the same principle applies to copy-
rights. Id. at 223-27. The Court reiterated this in Dastar noting, "the right to copy, and to
copy without attribution, once a copyright has expired, like 'the right to make [an article
whose patent has expired]I-including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried
when patented-passes to the public.'" 539 U.S. at 33 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co., v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964)). In recent years, the dramatic growth in intellectual
property protections, including copyright, has spurred increased concern among scholars
for protecting the public domain. See, e.g., Peter Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L.
REv. 331, 398-401 & nn.491-99 (collecting commentary on the public domain).
20051 205
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Constitutional requirement that copyright be granted only "for
limited times.
24
What is surprising and somewhat troubling about Dastar, how-
ever, is not its specific holding with respect to expired copyrights,
but the rationale and the largely unexamined premise on which it
relied in reaching this result. Specifically, as discussed below, the
Supreme Court accepted, without adequate examination, a ques-
tionable interpretation of the language and the underlying legisla-
tive intent of section 43(a), drawing a tenuous and largely
unsupported distinction between tangible and intangible goods as
subject matter to which section 43(a) might be applied.
II. THE RATIONALE OF DASTAR
Although the Dastar Court did not question the premise that
section 43(a) applies to reverse passing off claims that involve false
representations of the physical source of tangible goods, it reached
the opposite conclusion with respect to false representations of the
source of the intangible contents of expressive works. As discussed
below, there is little support for either of these conclusions in the
text of section 43(a) or in its legislative history. First, it is unclear
whether section 43(a) applies to reverse passing off at all. Second,
if Congress did intend for section 43(a) to provide a federal cause
of action for reverse passing off, the evidence belies the Court's
conclusion that Congress meant to exclude expressive works from
the scope of this federal cause of action. In fact, section 43(a) sug-
gests that Congress was more concerned about reverse passing off in
the case of expressive works than in the case of any other kind of
goods.
A. The Court's Unexamined Assumption that Section 43(a) Applies to
Reverse Passing Off of Tangible Goods
1. Misleading Use of Precedent
When the Supreme Court asserted that the repackaging and
relabeling of New Line's videotapes under the Dastar label would
"undoubtedly" have constituted reverse passing off under section
24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (often called the "Intellectual Property Clause") (author-
izing Congress "[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for lim-
ited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries."). The question of whether Congress may exercise its other powers - such as
the commerce power - to grant rights exceeding those which it would be empowered to
grant under the Intellectual Property Clause continues to be controversial. See, e.g.,
Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 272
(2004) (surveying scholarship that views the Intellectual Property Clause as a limit on those
other powers, but arguing for the opposite conclusion).
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43 (a), it bowed to what was perceived to be the unanimous views of
the circuit courts of appeal that had already considered and en-
dorsed the application of section 43(a) to claims of reverse passing
off:
[E]very Circuit to consider the issue found § 43(a) broad
enough to encompass reverse passing off ... The Trademark
Law Revision Act of 1988 made clear that § 43(a) covers origin
of production as well as geographic origin. Its language is amply
inclusive, moreover, of reverse passing off-if indeed it does not
implicitly adopt the unanimous court-of-appeals jurisprudence
on that subject.25
The federal courts in the past have readily embraced the argu-
ment that section 43(a) applies to claims of reverse passing off. 26
However, a closer look at the reasoning in those decisions reveals
that it provides weak to nonexistent support for applying this inter-
pretation of section 43(a) to the post-TLRA version of section
43(a). Specifically, as authority for applying section 43(a) to re-
verse passing off of tangible goods, but not to intangible expressive
works, each of these precedents suffers from one or more of the
following defects: (a) the precedent is inafpplicable because it did
not involve passing off at all, but rather false advertising; (b) con-
trary to Dasta's holding, the precedent indicates that section 43(a)
does apply to reverse passing off of expressive works; or (c) the pre-
cedent applied the pre-TLRA version of section 43 (a), rather than
the version which was at issue in Dastar. Each of these defects will
be addressed in turn.
a. False Advertising Precedents
The majority of the "reverse passing off" cases on which Dastar
relied did not involve reverse passing off at all. Rather, they in-
volved false descriptions of a defendant's own merchandise27 -
25 539 U.S. at 30 (collecting cases).
26 See Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 963-964, n.6 (D.C. Cir.
1990); Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 691 F.2d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 1982); Arrow United
Indus., Inc. v. Hugh Richards, Inc., 678 F.2d 410, 415 (2d Cir. 1982); F.E.L. Publ'ns., Ltd. v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 214 U.S.P.Q. 409, 416 (7th Cir. 1982); Smith v. Montoro, 648
F.2d 602, 603 (9th Cir. 1981); Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Universal Marine Co., 543
F.2d 1107, 1109 (5th Cir. 1976).
27 See Alpo Petfoods, Inc., 913 F.2d at 963-964, n.6 (regarding false advertising); Arrow
United Indus., Inc., 678 F.2d at 415 (regarding false advertising); Bangor Punta Operations,
Inc., 543 F.2d at 1109 (regarding false advertising). In Bangor Punta Operations, for exam-
ple, where the defendant used a picture of plaintiffs trawler in its advertising materials,
representing it to be a picture of its own trawler, the Court relied on several earlier cases
that had applied the same interpretation of the pre-1988 version of section 43(a). See
Alum-A-Fold Shutter Corp. v. Folding Shutter Corp., 441 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1971); Ameri-
can Precast Corp. v. Maurice Concrete Prods., 360 F. Supp. 859 (D. Mass. 1973) (finding
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claims that would be actionable today, if at all, under section
43(a) (1) (B), the false advertising branch of section 43(a). 2' Ac-
cordingly, the cases provide no authority for applying section
43(a) to claims of reverse passing off.
In each of these earlier false advertising cases, the defendant
had used either images or samples of the plaintiffs goods as exem-
plars of its own goods, but had not in fact trafficked in the plain-
tiffs goods, since the goods the defendant actually provided to
customers were its own. 29 This is far different from actually selling
the plaintiffs goods under the defendant's name. By showing sam-
ples or pictures of the plaintiffs goods to potential customers, the
defendants were implying to customers that their own goods were
identical to the plaintiff's goods. In cases where this statement was
accurate, it should not have been actionable. In cases where it was
inaccurate, it was actionable because the defendant was making
false statements about the qualities of its own goods; it was not
making false statements about the origin of the plaintiff's goods.
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition confirms this analysis."0
unfair competition where defendant used pictures of plaintiff's product to advertise its
own), afffd, 502 F.2d 1159 (1st Cir. 1974). In Crossbow, Inc. v. Dan-Dee Imps. Inc., 266 F.
Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), the court found unfair competition where the defendant cop-
ied plaintiff's product and packaging, used plaintiffs product as a sales sample and dem-
onstration model for its own product, and accepted orders for plaintiffs product by brand
name. Crossbow cited earlier cases that had rejected common law claims of "reverse passing
off' against defendants who removed the plaintiffs source identifiers from a product and
used it as a sales sample for their own merchandise. Crossbow, 266 F. Supp. at 340 (citing
PIC Design Corp. v. Sterling Precision Corp., 231 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Mastro
Plastics Corp. v. Emenee Indus., Inc., 16 A.D.2d 420, 228 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1st Dept. 1962),
affd, no opinion, 12 N.Y.2d 826, 236 N.Y.S.2d 347, 187 N.E.2d 360 (1962)). Ironically, Cross-
bow noted that while Mastro Plastics rejected a common law claim of reverse passing off, it
allowed the plaintiff to amend its complaint to state a section 43(a) claim for reverse pass-
ing off. Crossbow, 266 F. Supp. at 340.
28 For a more detailed comparison of these two subsections, see infra notes 48-52 and
accompanying text.
29 In Alpo Petfoods, 913 F.2d at 960-61, each party made false claims about the qualities
of its own dog food products; in Arrow, 678 F.2d at 414-15, the defendant falsely repre-
sented samples of the plaintiffs product as its own, in an effort to solicit customers; and in
Bangor Punta, 543 F.2d at 1109, the defendant used pictures of the plaintiffs boat in adver-
tising the defendant's own services.
30 Comment (a) in section 5 of the RESTATEMENT notes that the type of claims
presented in such cases - where the defendant presents potential customers with samples
or pictures of the plaintiffs goods, with the plaintiffs trademark omitted, so as to falsely
suggest that the defendant's goods are identical, in order to persuade customers to buy the
defendant's goods - do not constitute reverse passing off. In those cases, the defendant
does not in fact sell the plaintiffs goods, but simply uses them to falsely suggest the quali-'
ties of the defendant's goods:
The misrepresentations that are the subject of this Section should be distin-
guished from those that may result from the use of goods produced by another,
or a photograph of such goods, as a sample or illustration of proffered goods
actually produced by the actor or obtained from third persons. Such conduct
may result in confusion of source in the traditional sense, see § 16, Comment a,
or in a misrepresentation of the qualities or characteristics of the actor's goods,
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Thus, the courts, which erroneously treated these as reverse pass-
ing off cases, simply failed to recognize this important distinction."
b. Precedents Involving Expressive Works
As noted above, most of the section 43(a) cases on which Das-
tar relied were inapposite, because they involved false advertising
rather than reverse passing off. In fact, only three of the section
43(a) cases cited favorably in Dastar actually addressed claims of
reverse passing off.32 Moreover, in a stunning irony, two out of
those three cases involved expressive works - the very category of
works to which Dastar held that reverse passing off should not ap-
ply. Nowhere in its opinion did the Court acknowledge this
inconsistency. 33
One of the expressive works cases cited in Dastar - Smith v.
Montoro3 4 - found a false designation of origin under section 43(a)
where an actor's film performance was falsely attributed to another
actor in the screen credits. The other case - F.E.L. Publications, Ltd.
v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago35 - found a false designation of origin
under section 43(a) where the defendant removed the plaintiffs
name and copyright notice from his copyrighted songs in church
hymnals, and substituted the name of defendant's parish in their
place. In each of these cases, federal courts found that section
43(a) provided a cause of action for reverse passing off of the con-
tents of an expressive work.
The third true reverse passing off case that Dastar cited - and
the only one that did not involve an expressive work - was Williams
v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,36 which involved source designations for en-
gine replacement parts. The defendant sold unused surplus parts
manufactured by the plaintiff, and identified them to customers
using the plaintiffs part numbers preceded by the letter "G."
see § 2, Illustration 8. However, such conduct is not within the scope of this
Section.
RESTATEMENT (THRu) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 5 cmt. a (1995).
31 Ironically, a post-Dastar case finally recognized this distinction. See Bretford Mfg. v.
Smith Sys. Mfg. Co., 286 F. Supp.2d 969, 971-72 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (rejecting section 43(a)
claim arising from defendant's use of plaintiff's product as a component of sample mer-
chandise defendant displayed to potential customers; applying Dastar analysis, and noting:
"[Tihe sample table was not the good offered for sale. What was offered for sale were the
tables later purchased [from defendant].")
32 See F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 214 U.S.P.Q. 409, 416
(7th Cir. 1982); Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 691 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1982); Smith v.
Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 603 (9th Cir. 1981).
33 Dastar, 539 U.S. 23.
34 648 F.2d 602, 603 (9th Cir. 1981).
35 214 U.S.P.Q. 409, 416 (7th Cir. 1982).
36 691 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1982).
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Based on industry-specific practices, the plaintiff argued that this
modification of the plaintiffs part numbers would imply to custom-
ers that the defendant (and not the plaintiff) was actually the man-
ufacturer of these parts.37 The court of appeals agreed that such a
false designation of the origin of the plaintiffs goods would be ac-
tionable reverse passing off under section 43 (a) if there was a likeli-
hood of confusion. 8 However, this portion of the decision was
dictum, because the court of appeals could not determine whether
reverse passing off had taken place, since the trial court had not
made any findings of fact as to what customers were likely to be-
lieve with respect to the source of the parts.
In a further irony, the Williams opinion - the only reverse pass-
ing off case cited in Dastar that involved non-expressive goods -
cited only two cases in support of its conclusion that section 43(a)
applied to claims of reverse passing off" - and one of those cases
was Smith v. Montoro, which involved an expressive work. The other
case on which Williams relied did not involve reverse passing off at
all; it was yet another mislabeled false advertising case.4"
Thus, apart from the dictum in Williams, the only cases cited
by Dastar that actually support application of section 43(a) to re-
verse passing off claims are those that involved reverse passing off
of expressive works. And the Williams dictum itself relied on one of
those same expressive works cases. Thus, it is all the more remarka-
ble that the Supreme Court relied on these cases to support the
application of section 43 (a) to reverse passing off of non-expressive
works, while denying its application in the case of expressive works.
c. Dastar's Failure to Address the Impact of the Trademark Law
Revision Act of 1988
Each of the putative reverse passing off cases Dastar cited -
37 Id. at 172.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 173.
40 Id. at 17 2.
41 See L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954). L'Aiglon
held that a plaintiff demonstrated reverse passing off, actionable under the pre-1988 ver-
sion of 43(a), where the defendant used a picture of the plaintiff's more expensive dress in
order to advertise the defendant's cheaper dress. However, the defendant in L'Aiglon
never sold any of the plaintiffs goods to the public, which is what would be required for a
true case of reverse passing off. Rather, this was simply a false advertising case, because the
defendant's use of a picture of the plaintiffs product constituted a "false description" of
the defendant's goods within the meaning of section 43(a). In discussing what it perceived
to be a "false description" cause of action under 43(a), the L'Aiglon court noted: "It seems
to us that Congress has defined a statutory civil wrong of false representation of goods in
commerce .... Perhaps this statutory tort bears closest resemblance to the already noted
tort of false advertising to the detriment of a competitor .... Id. at 651.
[Vol. 23:197
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including both the true reverse passing off cases and the misla-
beled false advertising cases - involved the pre-TLRA version of
section 43(a),42 the relevant text of which differs significantly from
the current text of the statute. For that additional reason, all of the
cases on which Dastar relied have limited value in interpreting the
current text, and should be considered only if, and to the extent
that, there is evidence that Congress intended to leave these pre-
1988 interpretations undisturbed when it changed the pertinent
language of section 43(a) in the 1988 TLRA amendments. 43 Ab-
sent such evidence, the Supreme Court's reliance on case law that
had interpreted an obsolete version of section 43(a), and its failure
to consider the impact of the TLRA amendments, greatly under-
mines the persuasiveness of the Dastar decision.
B. Pre- and Post-TLRA Versions of Section 43(a) Compared
In concluding that the current version of section 43(a) would
"undoubtedly" apply to reverse passing off of tangible goods, the
Dastar Court relied entirely on cases that had construed a pre-
TLRA version of section 43(a), which was worded quite differently
from the current version. It provided that:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection
with any goods or services, or any container or containers for
goods, a false designation of origin, or any false description or
representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely
to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or
services to enter into commerce, and any person who shall with
knowledge of the falsity of such designation or origin or descrip-
tion or representation cause or procure the same to be trans-
ported or used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier
42 See, e.g., Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 691 F.2d 168, 172-73 (3d Cir. 1982) (dic-
tum) (relying on Smith v. Montoro and L'Aiglon to conclude that pre-1988 version 43(a)
applied to reverse passing off, but noting that this was not the basis on which the lower
court granted the preliminary injunction under review); Arrow United Indus., Inc. v. Hugh
Richards, Inc., 678 F.2d 410, 415 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding reverse passing off under pre-
1988 version of 43(a) where defendant used samples of plaintiffs goods, representing
those goods as its own, to secure a contract to provide such goods to the customer); F.E.L.
Publ'n, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 214 U.S.P.Q. 409, 416 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding
that "false designation of origin" claim under pre-1988 version of 43(a) could be asserted if
consumers would be confused when defendant removed publisher's copyright information
from hymnals and substituted the name of the parish); Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602,
603 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding reverse passing off where defendant removed actor's name
from movie credits and substituted a different name); Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v.
Universal Marine Co., 543 F.2d 1107, 1109 (5th Cir. 1976) (addressing "false advertising"
claim under pre-1988 version of 43 (a), arising from defendant's misappropriation of plain-
tiff's advertising material, where defendant used a photo of plaintiffs trawler in its advertis-
ing, representing it as its own trawler).
43 Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (1988).
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to be transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action by any
person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of
origin or in the region in which the locality is situated, or by any
person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the
use of such false description or representation. 44
The TLRA amendments, in contrast, divided section 43(a)
into two parts.45 Subsection (a) (1) (A) applies to false or mislead-
ing designations of origin, affiliation, or sponsorship of a defendant's
goods, services, or commercial activities.4 6 Subsection (a) (1) (B) applies
to false representations, in commercial advertising or promotion,
with respect to the nature, qualities, characteristics, or geographic origin of
any person's goods, services, or commercial activities. Section
43 (a) (1) (B) has become known as the "false advertising" provision
of section 43(a).
Notably, section 43 (a) (1) (B) does not expressly prohibit false
representations about the non-geographic origin of a person's
goods or services, if the misrepresentation about origin does not
also misrepresent the nature, qualities, or characteristics of the goods
or services.4" But if the misrepresentation does pertain to nature,
qualities, characteristics, or geographic origin, the misrepresenta-
tion is actionable regardless of whether it applies to the plaintiffs
goods or the defendant's goods, because subsection (a) (1) (B) ap-
plies to misrepresentations about any person's goods, services, or
commercial activities, not just those of the plaintiff. 48
44 60 Stat. 441 (emphasis added).
45 Section 43(a) provides:
§ 1125. False designations of origin and false descriptions forbidden
(a) Civil action.
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or de-
vice, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as
to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commer-
cial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's
goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935.
46 Id. (emphasis added).
47 See generally Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 201 F.3d 1058 (8th Cir. 2000) (press
release did not concern nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of either
party's products, and did not constitute commercial advertising or promotion as required
by section 43(a) (1) (B)).
48 See, e.g., BellSouth Adv'g & Publ'g Corp. v. Lambert Publ'g, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1316
(1999) (false advertising claim under section 43(a) (1) (B) must involve false representation
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In contrast, the prohibition against false designations of origin
in subsection (a) (1) (A) refers only to misrepresentations involving
the defendant's own goods, services, or commercial activities. It says
nothing about misrepresentations that the defendant makes with
respect to the origin of the plaintiff's goods, services, or commercial
activities. If a defendant is to be held liable for making false state-
ments about "his or her" own goods, then it is circular to suggest
that the defendant's statements are false because the goods in
question are not in fact "his or her" own goods. One simply cannot
have it both ways: Either the "goods" that the defendant is accused
of misrepresenting are "his or her" own goods under section
(a) (1) (A), in which case the defendant's self-identification as the
source of those goods is by definition accurate, or the goods in
question are the plaintiffs goods. If they are the plaintiff's goods,
then section (a) (1) (A) does not apply, and the defendant's inaccu-
rate self-identification as the origin of those goods must be actiona-
ble, if at all, only under subsection (a) (1) (B), which addresses a
defendant's false statements about a plaintiffs goods.4 9
The wording of section 43(a) (1) (B) - the false advertising
provision - differs significantly from that of section 43(a) (1) (A).
The false advertising provision expressly applies to a defendant's
false representations as to "his or her or another person's goods, ser-
vices or commercial activities." Under traditional canons of statu-
tory construction, the difference in the language of (A) and (B)
strongly implies that Congress contemplated a distinction between
false representations about a defendant's own goods and false rep-
resentations about the goods of other parties, and that Congress
deliberately chose the narrower wording of section (A) in order to
apply that provision only to misrepresentations about the defen-
dant's own goods.5 ° Surprisingly, the Court did not even acknowl-
about defendant's or another's product or services), affd without op., 207 F.3d 663 (1lth Cir.
2000).
49 The Supreme Court did not acknowledge the circularity problem, even though the
problem is apparent from the Court's own language. In defining "passing off' and "re-
verse passing off," the Court implicitly acknowledges that reverse passing off applies only to
statements which a defendant makes about someone else's goods or services:
Passing off (or palming off, as it is sometimes called) occurs when a producer
misrepresents his own goods or services as someone else's. See, e.g., 0. & W.
Thum Co. v. Dickinson, 245 F. 609, 621 (6th Cir. 1917). "Reverse passing off,"
as its name implies, is the opposite: The producer misrepresents someone else's
goods or services as his own. See, e.g., Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 691 F.2d
168, 172 (3d Cir. 1982).
Dastar, 539 U.S. at 26 n.1. However, this clearly did not stop the Court from concluding
that "reverse passing off' is cognizable under section 43(a) (1) (A), even though that sec-
tion applies only to the defendant's own goods or services.
50 At least three familiar canons of construction are implicated here:
(1) "[T]he starting point for interpreting statutes is the language of the statute itself.
20051 213
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edge, much less evaluate, this difference in the language of the two
provisions.
Reverse passing off claims involve false statements about the
origin of a plaintiff's goods or services. The defendant in such a
case offers the public goods or services that in fact originated from
the plaintiff. The plaintiff complains that the defendant has falsely
attributed those goods or services to a source other than the plain-
tiff. 5 1 As indicated above, nothing in the express language of sec-
tion 43(a), in its current form, makes such false statements
actionable.
Thus, no text in section 43(a) facially provides a cause of ac-
tion against a defendant that puts its own name or trademark on
goods or services that someone else in fact provided. Only by
stretching the meaning of "nature, qualities, characteristics, or geo-
graphical origin" in subsection (a) (1) (B) could section 43(a) be
deemed to include such. non-geographic designations of origin.
Indeed, the specific inclusion of geographic origin in subsection
(a) (1) (B) strongly suggests, by reverse implication, that Congress
did not intend that subsection to encompass non-geographic origin
indicators. Nor should one interpret "nature, qualities, [or] char-
acteristics" to encompass the origin of a product, because identical
goods may come from different sources. In drafting the TLRA
amendments, the 1988 Congress deliberately chose to apply sub-
section (a) (1) (A) to non-geographic origin indicators, and to ap-
ply subsection (a) (1) (B) to geographic origin indicators. Under
fundamental canons of statutory construction,52 the plain language
Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordina-
rily be regarded as conclusive." Consumer Prods. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
(2) "[It is a] settled rule that a statute must, if possible, be construed in such a fashion
that every word must have some operative effect." United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 112 S.
Ct. 1011, 1015 (1992); accord, Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338 (1979) (assert-
ing that "[iun construing a statute, we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word
[the legislature] used.").
(3) "Canons of construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive
be given separate meanings, unless the context dictates otherwise." Reiter, 442 U.S. at 339.
51 See, e.g., F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 214 U.S.P.Q. 409,
416, 1982 WL 19198 (7th Cir. 1982) (defendant took credit as the source of plaintiff's
hymns); Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 603 (9th Cir. 1981) (defendant attributed plain-
tiff's film performance to another actor); Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 691 F.2d 168
(3d Cir. 1982) (defendant's numbering system arguably implied that it was the manufac-
turer of plaintiffs engine parts).
52 When Congress includes particular language in one part of a statute but omits it in
another part of the same statute, it is presumed that Congress acted intentionally in the
inclusion and exclusion. See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co. 534 U.S. 438, 452 (2002); Bates
v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29-30 (1997); 73 Am. JUR. 2 D Statutes § 131 (2004). Another
relevant principle has been articulated as expressio unius est exclusio alterius ("the expression
of one thing implies exclusion of others") and inclusio unius est exclusio alterius ("the inclu-
sion of one thing implies exclusion of others"). See United States v. Ray, 375 F.3d 980, 999-
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of section 43(a) (1) (B), as revised in 1988, is simply inapplicable to
non-geographic source designations, and therefore does not apply
to claims of reverse passing off with respect to either tangible or
intangible goods.
Under this literal interpretation, section 43(a) does not pro-
vide a cause of action against a defendant that falsely identifies it-
self as the originator of goods or services that actually emanated
from the plaintiff. The crucial question, which Dastar did not ad-
dress, is whether this literal reading accurately reflects the intent of
Congress in enacting the TLRA.
If the literal interpretation is correct, that same interpretation
might also preclude a section 43(a) claim where a defendant falsely
suggests that the plaintiffs goods come from a maker other than
the plaintiff or the defendant. For example, this interpretation
might preclude a claim under section 43 (a) where a defendant has
falsely asserted that the plaintiffs goods are made by terrorists, by
members of a Satanic cult, by non-union labor, by convicted felons,
or by a manufacturer with a reputation for inferior goods. Yet
these are the kind of false and injurious statements that Congress
almost certainly would have intended section 43(a) (1) (B) to
render actionable." Such false statements could be as harmful as
those that more directly reference the nature, qualities or charac-
teristics of the plaintiffs goods. Thus, despite the narrow language
of section 43(a) (1) (B), it can be argued that Congress intended to
treat the identity of the maker of goods, or the provider of services,
as one of the "characteristics" of those goods or services under sec-
tion 43(a) (1) (B). Under this interpretation, 43(a) (1) (B) would
encompass reverse passing off even though the underlying false
statements would still be beyond the scope of section 43(a) (1) (A);
however, even under this interpretation, section 43(a)(1)(B)
1000 (9th Cir. 2004) (where federal statute assigns different obligations to courts and to a
federal agency, this demonstrates that "Congress is not only capable of distinguishing be-
tween the two entities, but that if it had intended [to impose the same obligations], it
could have clearly said so in the statute."); 73 AM.JUR. 2D Statutes § 129 (2004) (listing cases
citing each principle). Based on these principles, the reference to "origin, sponsorship, or
approval" in subsection (a) (1) (A) must mean something different from "nature, character-
istics, qualities, or geographic origin" in subsection (a)(1)(B).
53 For example, Procter & Gamble brought two suits under the current version of sec-
tion 43(a), in different circuits, when an Amway distributor spread rumors that Procter &
Gamble was affiliated with Satanism. Both suits involved the same incidents of false adver-
tising involving the plaintiff's commercial activities. However, the opinion in the Tenth
Circuit case clearly indicates that the claim was brought under section 43(a) (1) (B), see
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 317 F.3d 1121, 1124 (5th Cir. 2003), and the opinion
emphasizes the words "characteristics" and "qualities" in that subsection. Id. at 1124 n.3.
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit opiniott in Procter & Gamble v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539
(5th Cir. 2001), refers to the same claim only as a "§ 43(a)" claim, and then quotes only
subsection (a)(1)(A). Id. at 545 & n.8.
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claims would still be limited to the context of commercial advertis-
ing and promotion.
A third interpretation of subsection (a) (1) (B) is also possible.
This provision could provide a remedy for some false designations
of origin, but not necessarily for those which constitute reverse
passing off. The basis for this interpretation is that some false des-
ignations of origin may indirectly reflect on the "nature, qualities,
or characteristics" of goods, and perhaps these are the only types of
non-geographic designations of origin that should fall within the
reach of subsection (a) (1) (B). A consumer could certainly per-
ceive a statement that Satanists, terrorists, non-union labor, felons,
or a low-end manufacturer created the plaintiffs goods as an indi-
cation of poor quality or other characteristics relevant to that indi-
vidual's purchasing decision. At least some consumers are likely to
use this kind of information to determine whether the product
meets their needs. 4 For example, ardent union supporters might
be deeply offended by having non-union goods in their homes.
Even more people might be reluctant to make purchases that
would provide financial support to terrorists or Satanists. Cer-
tainly, most consumers would be cautious about buying goods
made by a manufacturer with a purported reputation for poor
quality.
These types of false - and derogatory - indications of origin
may more properly be understood as constituting "false advertis-
ing" about a competitor's goods than, for example, a false state-
ment in which the defendant itself tries to claim credit as the
source of a competitor's goods - the classic reverse passing off sce-
nario. A defendant's effort to claim credit for another's merchan-
dise is unlikely to involve disparagement of the characteristics of
those goods. Indeed, just the opposite is likely to be true, in that
the defendant is attempting to bolster its own reputation by taking
credit for the plaintiff's successful production activities. 55 There-
fore, the subsection (a) (1) (B) prohibition against false statements
about the characteristics of products made by someone other than
54 Thus, for example, the Tenth Circuit viewed allegations of Satanic affiliations as rele-
vant to the characteristics or qualities of Proctor & Gamble's products. Haugen, 317 F.3d at
1124 & n.3.
55 One might analogize this situation to certification marks, which, while protected by
the Lanham Act, are not considered designations of a particular source, and indeed will
fail to qualify for protection as certification marks if they are ever used as source indicators.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2004) (defining "certification mark"). A mark indicating that goods are
made by union labor, that they originate in a certain geographic region, that they were
manufactured using a particular process, or that they meet certain standards for quality,
would be a certification mark. The "Underwriter's Laboratory," "Energy Star," or "AAA"
marks would be examples of certification marks.
[Vol. 23:197
HeinOnline -- 23 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 216 2005-2006
WHEN YOU WISH UPON DASTAR
the defendant might apply to certain false designations of origin
that carry strong implications regarding quality or characteristics
(e.g., made by Satanists). They might not apply, however, to false
designations that merely deny credit to the true manufacturer. Be-
cause reverse passing off cases typically involve false designations of
the latter sort, they have little to do with the perceived quality or
characteristics of the goods in question. Accordingly, under this
interpretation they would not be encompassed by subsection
(a) (1) (B).
Therefore, the language of section 43(a) does not support the
Supreme Court's assumption that if Dastar had simply altered the
source indicators on New Line's physical goods, this action would
"undoubtedly" have given rise to a section 43(a) claim. If Dastar
were to repackage New Line's actual videotapes under its own
name, it would not be falsely representing the origin of its own
goods. Instead, Dastar would be doing one of two things. First, it
might be falsely representing the origin of New Line's goods. In
the alternative, it would not be falsely representing the origin of
any goods at all, because, as the party making these particular vide-
otapes available to consumers, Dastar could accurately present it-
self to those consumers as the originator of the tapes.
Which of these characterizations is correct depends on what
the term "origin" means in section 43(a) (1) (A). If the "origin" of
the goods is the party that is actually offering the goods to the public
- rather than the source from which that party obtained them -
then Dastar as mere repackager of New Line's tapes would be tell-
ing the truth by designating itself the origin of the repackaged
tapes. If, however, the actual physical maker of the tapes is consid-
ered to be the "origin" of those tapes, then Dastar as mere repack-
ager would indeed be misrepresenting the origin of New Line's
goods. In either case, however, Dastar's relabeling of New Line's
physical goods would not involve a false representation about the
origin of Dastar's own goods. Thus, notwithstanding the Court's
assumptions to the contrary, Dastar's relabeling of New Line's
tapes would fall outside the literal text of section 43(a) (1) (A).
And, based on the text of the false advertising prong of section
43 (a), in the absence of any false representations about the quali-
ties or characteristics of the tapes, the relabeling would also not be
actionable under section 43(a) (1) (B). Accordingly, the text of the
Lanham Act provides little support for the Supreme Court's claim
that relabeling another merchant's goods is "undoubtedly" actiona-
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ble as reverse passing off under section 43(a).5 6
As discussed in Part IV below, the legislative history of the
TLRA is ambiguous with regard to Congress' intent to ratify the
pre-1988 case law that had applied section 43(a) to reverse passing
off. If the interpretation of section 43(a) set forth above is correct,
however, then a false designation of a non-geographic origin that
pertains only to a plaintiffs goods or services would be actionable -
if at all - only under subsection (B) of section 43 (a) (1). It would,
however, be actionable under either (A) or (B) when it pertains to
a defendant's goods or services.
The reverse passing off claim in Dastar alleged a false designa-
tion of the origin of the plaintiffs goods. Therefore it should not
have been cognizable under subsection (a) (1) (A) at all. In addi-
tion, since this particular false designation did not pertain to the
nature, quality, characteristics, or geographic origin of the video-
tapes, it probably should not have been cognizable under subsec-
tion (a) (1) (B) either. A strong argument can therefore be made,
based on the statutory language, that the reverse passing off claim
under section 43(a) in Dastarshould have been rejected regardless
of whether it pertained to tangible or intangible goods. "
Thus, based on the literal text of section 43(a), it appears that
reverse passing off need not be recognized at all under section
43(a) for either tangible or intangible goods, or for services or for
56 In addition, the "commercial advertising or promotion" language in section
43(a) (1) (B) imposes a further limitation on the applicability of that subsection to claims of
reverse passing off. A claim arises under this provision only if the false representation
about the qualities or geographic origin of goods or services takes place in the context of
"commercial advertising or promotion." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2004). While the
packaging of a DVD or videotape might qualify, the credits listed on the film itself probably
would not, because these credits are not visible to consumers when the DVD or videotape
is being marketed. See Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
false statements made on a television show were not actionable under section 43(a) (1) (B)
because they were not made in promotion or marketing of the show; statements on the
jacket of videotape were also not actionable because they could not be observed by poten-
tial customers prior to purchase and, therefore, did not influence purchasing decision).
See generally Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst. v. Saks Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d 302 (1st Cir.
2002) (holding that false advertising claim under Lanham Act must involve a statement
that is likely to influence the purchasing decision); First Health Group Corp. v. BCE
Emergis Corp., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 2001), amended by No. 00-3833, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24477 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that "commercial advertising or promotion" in sec-
tion 43(a) (1) (B) is not a synonym for all commercial speech subject to federal regulation);
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 222 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2000) (representations in "com-
mercial advertising or promotion" under section 43(a) (1) (B) must be made for purpose of
influencing purchasing decision).
57 Because none of the briefs submitted in Dastar addressed this issue, it is hardly sur-
prising that the Court ignored it as well. Nonetheless, a decision based on a version of
section 43(a) that was no longer in effect when the alleged infringement took place is built
on a flimsy foundation.
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any of the "other commercial activities" encompassed by section
43(a).
As discussed below, however, the legislative history of the
TLRA and closely related statutes may evidence a contrary intent.
Furthermore, to the extent that this history supports the applica-
tion of section 43(a) to reverse passing off, it also suggests that the
Dastar Court's distinction between tangible goods and expressive
works is inconsistent with the intent of Congress.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: EVIDENCE OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
TO APPLY POST-1988 SECTION 43(a) TO REVERSE PASSING
OFF OF ExPRESSrE WORKS
In construing the scope of section 43(a), it is helpful to con-
sider not only the legislative history of the TLRA itself, but also the
legislative history of two closely related statutes - the BCIA58 and
the VARA. 5' As discussed below, a review of these histories reveals
that at no time has Congress clearly stated its intent to include re-
verse passing off of tangible goods in either section (a) (1) (A) or
section (a) (1) (B). Ironically, however, on the few occasions that
Congress has implied its endorsement of reverse passing off claims
under section 43(a), that endorsement has applied specifically to
intangible, expressive works. This suggests that Dastar's conclusion
may be precisely the opposite of what Congress intended.
Although the legislative history of the TLRA itself is largely
inconclusive on the question of reverse passing off, a close review
of the legislative histories of the BCIA and the VARA suggests that
Congress would not have endorsed the Supreme Court's decision
to protect tangible but not expressive origins. It suggests, moreo-
ver, that Congress might have been willing to endorse a completely
different distinction in the context of reverse passing off - a dis-
tinction between affirmatively false or misleading representations
of origin, and representations of origin that are merely omitted or
incomplete. Such a distinction, if applied to the facts presented in
Dastar, would permit New Line to recover for reverse passing of its
creative content, but only if Dastar made -affirmatively false or mis-
leading representations of origin that would materially affect the
consumer's purchasing decision.
A. Trademark Law Revision Act
Let us assume, arguendo, that the source of a good or service
58 Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
59 Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990).
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can in some cases be treated as one of its "characteristics" for pur-
poses of section 43(a) (1) (B). Does this mean that reverse passing
off is actionable under that provision, even if it is not actionable
under section 43(a) (1) (A)? If the answer is no, then false state-
ments about the origin of another party's goods or services are
never actionable under section 43 (a), and Dastar's assumption that
such a cause of action would "undoubtedly" exist for tangible vide-
otapes is simply wrong. If the answer is yes,' then Dastar's assump-
tion regarding tangible goods was correct, but its holding to the
contrary for expressive works is justified only if the Court's distinc-
tion between tangible and intangible goods is consistent with the
intent of Congress.
In spite of the literal language of section 43(a), there is evi-
dence in the legislative history of the TLRA that Congress in fact
did not intend to overrule most previous judicial interpretations of
section 43(a). As noted earlier, these included a significant line of
cases that stated, correctly or not, that section 43(a) applied to re-
verse passing off, and reached this conclusion with respect to both
tangible and intangible goods. The legislative history is, however,
ambiguous. 61
For example, the 1988 Report of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee states that the TLRA revisions to section 43(a) were intended
"to codify the interpretation it has been given by the courts."62 Al-
60 The Amicus Brief submitted by the International Trademark Association in Dastar
suggests that reverse passing off is a type of false advertising under section 43(a) (1) (B). See
Brief of Amicus Curiae the International Trademark Association in Support of Neither
Party, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, (2003) at 11-12 & n.8
(No. 02-428); see also Lori H. Freedman, Reverse Passing Off. A Great Deal of Confusion, 83
TRADEMARK REP. 305 (1993) (suggesting that reverse passing off claims should be actiona-
ble under section 43(a) (1) (B) rather than section 43(a) (1) (A)); Lamothe v. Ad. Record-
ing Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 1406 (9th Cir. 1988) (considering, without deciding, whether
reverse passing off is actionable as false advertising).
61 Professor Jean Burns has commented that the legislative history of the TLRA's revi-
sions to section 43(a) "creates as much confusion as clarity." Jean Wegman Burns, Confused
Jurisprudence: False Advertising Under the Lanham Act, 79 B.U. L. Rv. 807, 820 (1999); see also
Frank Z. Hellwig, The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988: The 100th Congress Leaves Its Mark,
79 TRADEMARK REP. 287, 311 (1989) (commenting on the "lack of a unifying legislative
history."). However, confusion about the congressional intent underlying section 43(a) is
not unique to the TLRA amendments. See, e.g., THE UNITED STATES TRADEMARK AsSOCIA-
TION, Trademark Review Commission Report and Recommendations to USTA President and Board of
Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 426 (1987) (stating that "Section 43(a) is an enigma, but
a very popular one. Narrowly drawn and intended to reach false designations or represen-
tations as to the geographical origin of products, the section has been widely interpreted to
create, in essence, a federal law of unfair competition.") (quoted in Scholastic, Inc. v.
Stouffer, 124 F. Supp. 2d 836, 842 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)); Callman on Unfair Competition,
§ 5.5 (noting that, from the enactment of the Lanham Act in 1946 all the way to the enact-
ment of the TLRA in 1988, federal courts were unable to reach a clear consensus on
whether section 43(a) covered false advertising claims).
62 S. REP. No. 100-515, at 40 (1988).
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though this can be read as an endorsement of the pre-1988 case
law applying section 43(a) to reverse passing off, those precedents
are noticeably omitted from the illustrative list that immediately
follows: "For example, it has been applied to cases involving the
infringement of unregistered marks, violations of trade dress and
certain nonfunctional configurations of goods and actionable false
advertising claims."6
The Report specifically states the Committee's intent to over-
rule one line of cases, originating with Bernard Food Industries v.
Dietene Co.,64 holding "that Section 43(a) applies only to misrepre-
sentations about one's own products or services; it does not extend
to misrepresentations about [a] competitor's products or ser-
vices."65 Accordingly, the Report continues, the TLRA amended
section 43(a) "to make clear that misrepresentations about an-
other's products are as actionable as misrepresentations about
one's own."6 6 This intent was manifested in section 43(a) (1) (B),
the false advertising branch of section 43(a).
The 1988 Senate Report also notes that the Senate Judiciary
Committee deleted proposed language stating that omissions of ma-
terial information which misrepresent the nature, characteristics or
qualities of a product or service are actionable under the section.
This deletion was made to respond to concerns that it could be
misread to require that all facts material to a consumer's decision
to purchase a product or service be contained in each advertise-
ment. Currently, the question of when Section 43(a) reaches fail-
ure to disclose information material to a consumer's purchasing
decision is an open question in the courts. The committee does
not, through the deletion, indicate that it condones deceptive ad-
vertising, whether by affirmative misrepresentation or material
omission, and leaves to the courts the task offurther developing an apply-
ing this principle under section 43(a).67
The 1988 legislative history thus contains no specific indica-
tion that Congress intended to encompass claims of reverse passing
off under either section (a) (1) (A) or (a) (1) (B). In the absence of
any other evidence of such intent, it would seem that the literal
language of the statute should control, and reverse passing off
should not be recognized under section 43(a). However, as dis-
63 Id.
64 415 F.2d 1279, 163 U.S.P.Q. 264 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912, 164
U.S.P.Q. 481 (1970), cited in S. RFP. No. 100-515, at 40 (1988).
65 S. REP. No. 100-515, at 40 (citing Bernard Food Indus., 415 F.2d at 1283).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
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cussed below, contrary inferences may be drawn from the legisla-
tive history of the contemporaneous BCIA, as well as the VARA,
which was enacted only two years later.
B. The Berne Convention Implementation Act as Evidence of
Congressional Intent to Provide a Section 43(a) Remedy for
Misattribution of Works of Authorship
In the same year that it enacted the TLRA, Congress consid-
ered and enacted the BCIA.68 The near-simultaneous considera-
tion and enactment of these statutes makes the BCIA's legislative
history particularly helpful in interpreting the TLRA. Unfortu-
nately, the Dastar opinion overlooks evidence in the BCIA's history
which strongly suggests that the 100th Congress not only acqui-
esced in the application of section 43(a) to false attributions of
works of authorship, but expressly endorsed that application as an
important component of the network of state and federal laws
upon which Congress relied in concluding that the United States
could comply with the moral rights provisions of the Berne Con-
vention without enacting any new moral rights legislation. In con-
trast to the legislative history of the TLRA, which is highly
ambiguous in its treatment of reverse passing off claims in general,
the legislative history of the BCIA strongly suggests that the 1988
Congress approved of applying section 43(a) to reverse passing off
of literary and artistic works. Arguably, then there is a stronger
case for applying section 43(a) to reverse passing off of expressive
works than to reverse passing off of tangible goods - contrary to
the conclusion drawn by the Court in Dastar.
The BCIA brought federal copyright laws into compliance
with the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artis-
tic Works, the leading international copyright convention. In the
congressional debates that led to enactment of the BCIA, a crucial
question was whether new legislation would be needed to bring the
U.S. into compliance with the "moral rights" provisions of the
Berne Convention, which required signatories to protect authors'
rights to receive proper attribution for their work and to object to
derogatory alterations of their work.6" The Berne attribution right
68 Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
69 Article 6bis provides:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of
the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work
and to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other
derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to
his honor or reputation.
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represents a variety of reverse passing off, as illustrated in Smith v.
Montoro and the "bodily appropriation" cases, while the right to ob-
ject to alterations corresponds to traditional passing off of the type
recognized in Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos. and King v. Inno-
vation Books, cases in which author/plaintiffs objected to having
their names associated with significantly altered versions of their
works.
The history of the BCIA strongly supports the inference that
the 100th Congress understood section 43 (a) to apply to intangible
works of authorship rather than merely tangible goods, and that it
held this understanding during the same time period when it con-
sidered and enacted the TLRA. In determining whether Berne
would require the United States to enact moral rights legislation,
Congress considered the conclusions reached by a committee of
copyright experts assembled by the Department of State.7° The Fi-
nal Report of Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the
Berne Convention,71 issued in 1986, cited the then-current version
of section 43(a) as a proxy for the moral rights of attribution and
integrity. With respect to attribution, the Report unequivocally
states that section 43(a) (as in effect at that time) "prohibits false
designations of origins of works, including intellectual and artistic
works, and prohibits false descriptions and representations of such
works."72 Citing Smith v. Montoro and work of the late Professor
Melville Nimmer, the Report notes "that omission of an author's
name from his work may constitute 'an implied reverse passing off
and thus violate section 43(a)."" When publication without attri-
bution misleads the public into thinking that the publisher or pro-
ducer of a work, rather than its author, was the originator of the
work, the Report states, "[this is a false designation of origin
under section 43(a)."" With respect to reverse passing off, the Re-
port notes, in a section captioned "Prohibiting Identification of An-
other as Creator of the Author's Work" that "[f] alse identification
of another as author . . . may give rise to a claim by the actual
author under section 43(a)."75 In a section captioned "Prohibiting
Identification of the Author as Creator of Another's Work" - a ref-
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, art. 6bis,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1986).
70 H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 37-38 (1988).
71 Final Report of Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, reprinted
in 10 COLUM.-VLAJ. L. & ARTS 513, 547-57 (1986) [hereinafter Final Report].
72 Id. at 36.
73 Id. at 41.
74 Id.
75 Id.
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erence to traditional passing off - the Report recognizes a series of
federal cases as precedents supporting a remedy for "false identifi-
cation" of expressive works under section 43(a) .76 Finally, with re-
spect to the right of integrity, the Final Report cites Gilliam as a
leading case, noting that "[c]ourts increasingly have granted au-
thors protection for the integrity of their work under section
43(a)."7
Some members of the Working Group disagreed with the Fi-
nal Report's conclusion that extant U.S. law fully complied with the
moral rights provisions of Berne. Subsequent scholars have criti-
cized that conclusion as well. 78 Congress, on the other hand, read-
ily accepted the Report's conclusion, and enacted the BCIA
without enacting any new moral rights legislation. 79  The Senate
Report accompanying the BCIA noted:
[P] rotection is provided under existing U.S. law for the rights of
authors listed in Article 6bis: (1) to claim authorship of their
works ('the right of paternity'); and (2) to object to distortion,
mutilation or other modification of their works, or other derog-
atory action with respect thereto, that would prejudice their
honor or reputation (the 'right of integrity'). This existing U.S.
law includes various provisions of the Copyright Act and
L[a]nham Act, various state statutes, and common law princi-
ples such as libel, defamation, misrepresentation, and unfair
competition, which have been applied by courts to redress au-
thors' invocation of the right to claim authorship or the right to
object to distortion. Section 2(3) of the Act clarifies that the
amendments made by this Act, together with the law as it exists
on the date of enactment of the Act, satisfy U.S. obligations
under Article 6bis and that no further rights or interests shall be
76 Id. (citing Follett v. New Am. Library, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Geisel v.
Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); and "cases involving recording
artists").
77 Final Report, supra note 71, at 42-43.
78 Many commentators have criticized the conclusion in the BCIA House Report, H.R.
REP. No. 100-609, at 37-38 (1988), that the combination of federal and state laws then in
existence was sufficient to satisfy the moral rights requirements of Article 6bis of Berne. See
e.g., John M. Kernochan, Comments of John M. Kernochan, in Final Report, supra note 71, at
173, 174 (calling this conclusion "tenuous"); Edward J. Damich, Moral Rights in the United
States and Article 6bis of the Berne Convention: A Comment on the Preliminary Report of the Ad Hoc
Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, in Final Report, supra note 71, at 143,
150-51 (calling U.S. moral rights protection "virtually non-existent"); Russ VerSteeg, Federal
MoralRightsfor Visual Artists: Contract Theory and Analysis, 67 WASH. L. REv. 827, 832 (1992).
See generally Robert J. Sherman, Note, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: American Artists
Burned Again, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 405-409 & nn.185-93 (1995) (collecting commen-
tary critical of the House Report's conclusion).
79 The Working Group's Final Report was the basis for most of the provisions of the
BCIA. See William Belanger, U.S. Compliance with the Berne Convention, 3 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 373, 391 (1995).
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recognized or created for that purpose.8 0
The House Committee on the Judiciary agreed, stating in its
report on the BCIA that "[b]ased on a comparison of its laws with
those of Berne member countries, and on the current status of
Federal and State protections of the rights of paternity and integ-
rity, the Committee finds that current United States law meets the
requirements of Article 6bis."8 1
The House Report also supports the inference that Congress
understood section 43(a) to apply to works of authorship when it
enacted both the TLRA and the BCIA. The purpose of the BCLA
was to enact legislation that was necessary to bring the United
States into compliance with the BCIA, including its moral rights
provisions. The BCIA House Report repeatedly emphasized that
the Berne Convention was not self-executing,8 2 so thatjoining the
Convention would not automatically change existing domestic law,
and took the position that the amendments to Title 17 contained
in the BCIA, together with existing state and federal law, were suffi-
cient for full compliance.
On the specific question of whether amendments were
needed to comply with the requirements of Article 6bis regarding
the attribution and integrity rights, the House Report noted that
after two days of extensive testimony the "great majority" of experts
agreed "that no additional law-making was needed to satisfy" those
requirements. 8 3 In summarizing these arguments, the Report spe-
cifically mentions "section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, relating to
false designations of origin and false descriptions" 4 as a basis for
protecting moral rights. In addition, the Report specifically cites
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos.,8 5 which relied on both copy-
right law and section 43(a), as an example of a court finding ways
to "recognize [ ] the equivalent of such rights." 6 It also notes that,
more than twenty years earlier, Professor Melville Nimmer "wrote
that 'it might well be concluded' that the totality of then-current
law was sufficient to meet at least a 'narrowly construe[d]' defini-
tion of our obligations under Article 6bis." v8 The fact that "the law
80 S. REP. No. 100-352, at 9-10 (1988) (accompanying Pub. L. No. 100-568, Berne Con-
vention Implementation Act of 1988).
81 H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 38 (1988).
82 Id. at 23, 32, 38.
83 Id. at 33.
84 Id.
85 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
86 H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 34 (1988).
87 Id. at 34 n.67 (quoting Melville Nimmer, Implications of the Prospective Revisions of the
Berne Convention and the United States Copyright Law, 19 STAN. L. REv. 499, 525 (1967)).
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has changed dramatically since then," the Report concludes,
"add[s] more weight to this conclusion."88
The House Report noted that international copyright experts
who participated in a 1987 World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion ("W.I.P.O.") Roundtable in Geneva unanimously agreed with
this majority view.89 The Report quotes Dr. Arpad Bogsch, the Di-
rector General of W.I.P.O., as stating that:
The requirements under this Article can be fulfilled not only by
statutory provisions in a copyright statute but also by common
law and other statutes. I believe that in the United States the
common law and such statutes (Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act) contain the necessary law to fulfill any obligation for the
United States under Article 6bis.90
Regardless of whether the majority's view was correct as a mat-
ter of law, that view was unambiguously adopted by the House Re-
port.91 And while it is clear that the Report did not rely exclusively
on section 43(a) in concluding that the rights of attribution and
integrity were sufficiently protected under domestic law, the spe-
cific references to section 43(a) and Gilliam irrefutably demon-
strate that the 1988 Congress understood that section 43(a) had
already been applied to works of authorship, and that it had been
used to protect an author's attribution right and/or integrity right
in such works.
Although the BCIA's legislative history lists section 43(a) as
one source of moral rights, it does not specifically identify section
43(a) as the source of an attribution right. The attribution right
would normally correspond to protection against reverse passing
off (as in Smith v. Montoro or F.E.L. Publications), whereas the integ-
rity right would normally correspond to protection against tradi-
tional passing off (as in Gilliam or King). Thus, it is possible that
when Congress enacted the BCIA, it understood section 43(a) as
the source of a right of integrity, but was relying on state rather
than federal unfair competition law to supply the attribution right.
However, the deliberations on the BCIA took place at the same
time as the deliberations on the TLRA, and the same Congress en-
acted both statutes. As noted earlier, the TLRA legislative history
expressly endorses the pre-1988 judicial interpretations of section
43(a), except for those cases that had treated omitted attributions
88 Id. (suggesting, however, that "the prime example" of these dramatic changes was
the enactment of state "moral rights" statutes).
89 Id. at 36.
90 Id. at 37.
91 Id. at 38-39.
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as actionable. It is difficult to believe, then, that in the TLRA delib-
erations, the same Congress would endorse case law applying sec-
tion 43(a) to false attributions of authorship while rejecting that
same case law in their simultaneous BCIA deliberations. At the
very least, one would expect to see some language expressly indi-
cating such contradictory intent. Thus, in the absence of any lan-
guage in either legislative history expressly rejecting the
application of section 43(a) to affirmatively false attributions, par-
ticularly in light of Congress' express rejection (in the TLRA his-
tory) of section 43(a)'s application to mere omissions of
attribution, it seems far more reasonable to believe that the BCIA
legislative history endorses the application of section 43(a) to af-
firmatively false attributions of authorship in the case of expressive
works.
Thus, the legislative histories of both the TLRA and the BCIA
contradict Justice Scalia's assertion that the "origin" of "goods" in
section 43 (a) "refers to the producer of the tangible goods that are
offered for sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept, or
communication embodied in those goods. 9 2
The BCIA House Report also arguably refutes the Supreme
Court's statement in Dastar that Congress could not have intended
section 43(a) to apply to misattributions of authorship. Although
the Congress that first enacted section 43(a) in 1946 may not have
foreseen this application, there is also no evidence that it intended
to foreclose this application. Furthermore, it appears that a subse-
quent Congress, in 1988, understood that section 43(a) does cover
misattribution of works of authorship when it decided that compli-
ance with Article 6bis of Berne did not require enactment of a fed-
eral statute that would explicitly protect authors against
misattribution. It is a settled canon of construction that Congress'
silence in the face of longstanding judicial interpretations of a stat-
ute tends to imply Congress' tacit endorsement of those interpreta-
tions.9" Because the judicial interpretation of section 43(a) as
applicable to authorial misattribution began only in the 1970's, or-
dinarily this might not qualify as sufficiently longstanding to imply
congressional endorsement of that interpretation. However, Con-
gress's express reliance in 1988 on both federal and state unfair
competition law, including judicial interpretations of the relevant
statutes, as a form of moral rights protection against authorial mis-
92 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37.
93 See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200-201 (1974) (holding
that congressional silence in light of four decades of consistent judicial interpretation ar-
gues against finding this interpretation inconsistent with congressional intent).
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attribution sufficient to satisfy Article 6bis offers evidence far
stronger than congressional silence, suggesting that Congress was
both aware of, and untroubled by, this application of section 43 (a).
Surely, if the 1988 Congress had intended the TLRA to repudiate
the line of cases represented by Gilliam, Smith, and F.E.L. Publica-
tions, there would have been some indication of that intent in the
legislative history.
Thus, the simultaneous consideration of the TLRA and the
BCIA by the 1988 Congress seems to reinforce the view that Con-
gress intended section 43(a) to continue to protect expressive
works against reverse passing off. However, it does not clarify
whether, when Congress bifurcated old section 43(a) into its "false
designation" prong and its "false advertising" prong in the TLRA
amendments, it had a clear and definite notion of which prong
would thereafter apply to reverse passing off claims. As discussed
in Part II.B. above, neither prong describes the "reverse passing
off' scenario as clearly as it was described in the pre-1988 version of
section 43(a). With no clear congressional statement of intent, it
remains a mystery just how Congress intended the current version
of section 43(a) to encompass reverse passing off. However, the
BCIA history certainly implies that the 1988 Congress intended to
validate judicial interpretations that found protection against mis-
attribution of expressive works to be implicit in the pre-1988 ver-
sion of the statute.
Congress revisited the BCIA's legislative history just two years
later, when it enacted the very limited moral rights protections of
the VARA. The legislative history of the VARA provides further
evidence that Congress had already embraced the application of
section 43(a) to expressive works. Specifically, the House Report
on the VARA noted that, during the debates preceding the BCIA:
While some (chiefly motion picture directors and screenwriters)
argued that adherence to Berne required the enactment of new
laws, the vast majority of those urging adherence contended
that existing laws, both Federal and State, statutory and com-
mon, were sufficient to comply with the requirements of the
Convention. The Congress agreed with the latter viewpoint and
therefore enacted legislation to implement the Convention's re-
quirements without also enacting additional moral rights laws. 94
Therefore, prior to Dastar, substantial evidence indicated that
Congress endorsed the views of the federal courts that had inter-
94 H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 7-8 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6917-18
(1990) (footnotes omitted).
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preted section 43(a) to provide a remedy for affirmatively false at-
tribution of a work of authorship, at least with respect to
copyrightable works. Rather than questioning this interpretation,
courts instead focused on determining the proper legal test for
finding that the right had been infringed. The Ninth Circuit
adopted a requirement of near-wholesale copying - or "bodily ap-
propriation"95 - while the Second Circuit required only "substan-
tial similarity,"96 a standard more favorable to plaintiffs. Some
Circuits found the quantity of copying less important, relying in-
stead on a broader "likelihood of confusion" analysis to determine
when a false attribution amounted to reverse passing off under sec-
tion 43(a).9 7
According to Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, the moral
rights mandated by that Article must exist independently of the
economic aspects of copyright - that is, the rights provided by sec-
tion 106 of the Copyright Act - and should not be lost upon assign-
ment or exclusive license of the copyright:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after
the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to
claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action
in relation to, the said work, which shall be prejudicial to his
honor or reputation.98
The effect of Dastar, however, is to terminate the author's attri-
bution right when the author transfers the copyright. By rendering
section 43(a) incapable of protecting the creative "origin" of ex-
pressive works, Dastar makes copyright law the only federal means
for protecting attribution rights, and thus makes a federal attribu-
tion right unavailable to authors who do not own or control their
copyrights (for example, if they have assigned the copyright or
95 See, e.g., Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir. 1994); Shaw v. Lindheim,
919 F.2d 1353, 1364 (9th Cir. 1990); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir.
1984).
96 See, e.g., Waldman Publ'g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 784 (2d Cir. 1994).
97 See, e.g., Murray Hill Publ'n., Inc. v. ABC Communications, Inc., 264 F.3d 622, 634
(6th Cir. 2001); Lipscher v. LRP Publ'g., Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 1313-14 (l1th Cir. 2001);
King v. Ames, 179 F.3d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 1999); Batiste v. Island Records, Inc., 179 F.3d
217, 225 (5th Cir. 1999); PS Promotions, Inc. v. Stern, No. 97 C 3742, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3075 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2000); see also Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1299 n.27
(11th Cir. 1999) (comparing approaches).
98 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, supra note 69, at
art. 6bis. Berne does not prescribe any remedies for infringement of moral rights, how-
ever. Nor does Berne contain any general enforcement mechanisms to compel signatories
to comply with its provisions. See id. art. 6b/s(3) ("The means of redress for safeguarding
the rights granted by this Article shall be governed by the legislation of the country where
protection is claimed.").
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have licensed it without expressly reserving rights equivalent to an
attribution right). Accordingly, by making copyright the exclusive
means for protecting attribution rights under federal law, Dastar
now seems to have removed a large component of the federal attri-
bution protections on which Congress appears to have relied when
it determined, in 1988, that the existing combination of federal
and state laws in the United States satisfied the moral rights provi-
sions of Berne.99
Accordingly, if Dastar means what it says, the Berne-mandated
moral right of attribution is no longer protected under federal un-
fair competition law.'00 Ironically, it may still be protected under
state unfair competition laws, which were not at issue in Dastar.
However, the Supreme Court's concern that federal unfair competi-
tion law should not become a "mutant" form of copyright also
raises the possibility that similar moral rights protection will also be
denied under state laws, for two reasons. First, there is the spectre
of federal preemption, whereby state unfair competition laws
might be deemed preempted because states cannot be allowed to
provide "mutant" copyright protection if the latter would interfere
with the purposes of the federal copyright laws.1" 1 Second, some
99 Of course, this would not be the first instance in which the United States has failed to
comply with Berne. Article 18 required the United States to restore copyrights in works
from other Berne countries where those works have entered the public domain prema-
turely through failure to comply with formalities (such as notice or registration), yet the
United States did not restore those copyrights until 1996, when restoration was mandated
by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Including
Trade in Counterfeit Goods (TRIPS) provisions of the 1994 World Trade Organization
(WTO) Agreement, the terms of which were implemented by Congress in the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). Although the WTO
Agreement subjects signatory nations to penalties for failure to comply with the Berne
Convention, Article 9(1) of the TRIPS provisions expressly excludes the moral rights provi-
sions of Article 6bis.
100 It is less clear whether Dastar has any impact on uses of the Lanham Act to protect
the other Berne-mandated moral right, the right of integrity - that is, the author's right to
prevent certain derogatory alterations of a work - as illustrated by the Monty Python
troupe's victory in Gilliam, 538 F.2d 14, and Stephen King's partial victory in King, 976 F.2d
824. Prior to Dastar, section 43(a) was deemed to apply where a plaintiff altered a defen-
dant's copyrighted work but attributed the altered work to the defendant, and thus, argua-
bly misrepresented the authorship of the transformed work. Because these cases fit the
model of traditional passing off, rather than reverse passing off, it is not clear whether
Dastarwould prevent the application of section 43(a) to such claims. See infta notes 152-57
and accompanying text (discussing whether Dastar's interpretation of the "origin" of a
"good" would foreclose traditional passing off claims involving expressive works).
101 Because patent and copyright protection are the exclusive domain of federal law
(except for the very limited scope of common law copyright), state laws that provide intel-
lectual property protections that exceed limits deliberately imposed by Congress in the
federal patent or copyright laws, or that duplicate such laws, are generally held to be pre-
empted, even in the absence of a specific federal preemption statute. Compare Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (federal law preempted state
law providing patent- or copyright-like protection to boat hull designs), Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (federal law preempted an Illinois statute that ap-
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courts might hold Dastar's interpretation of section 43(a) also con-
trols the interpretation of the comparable state law.
10 2
If neither state nor federal unfair competition laws protect the
right of attribution, then the limited moral rights protection af-
forded by copyright law - the section 106 right to prevent unautho-
rized copying or derivative work creation, and the narrow moral
rights protection for works of visual art under section 106A - will
be the only forms of moral rights protection available under U.S.
law. Contrary to the dictates of Berne Article 6bis, in most cases
federal moral rights protection will be available only to the owner
of the economic rights in a work, and will not protect the author
once those rights have been transferred or have expired.
10 3
However, until each state's unfair competition laws are explic-
itly found to be preempted in this context, or subject to the same
narrow interpretation as section 43(a), they will still provide an al-
ternative, and piecemeal, way for some plaintiffs to protect attribu-
tion rights in their expressive works. Accordingly, unless and until
all state laws regarding reverse passing off are held to be subject to
the Dastar interpretation in the case of expressive works, that inter-
pretation will preclude some, but not all, plaintiffs from suc-
ceeding in their reverse passing off claims under state law,
resulting in inconsistent levels of moral rights protection across
jurisdictions.
The Dastar opinion points to section 106A as evidence that the
Congress that enacted the VARA in 1990 did not intend section
43(a) to protect the moral right of attribution. As the Court points
out, section 106A creates narrowly defined rights of attribution and
integrity for limited edition works of visual art, some of which
would arguably be superfluous if those rights were already fully
peared to provide patent-like protection to industrial designs regardless of whether the
designs were federally patented), and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S.
234 (1964) (similar to Sears), with Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (pre-1972
federal law did not preempt state law granting copyright-like protection to sound record-
ings, because Congress' failure to provide copyright protection to sound recordings did
not reflect deliberate decision to deny such protection), and Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (federal law did not preempt state trade secret law, because
latter did not undermine patent law's goal of encouraging public disclosure of novel
inventions).
102 In two post-Dastar cases raising claims of reverse passing off under California's unfair
competition statutes, Cal. Bus. Prof. Code §§ 17200, 17500 (2003), federal district courts in
California have rejected the claims, holding that the Supreme Court's interpretation of
section 43(a) requires a similar interpretation of state law, even though the language of the
California statutes in question bears little resemblance to that of section 43(a). Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp. v. Dastar Corp., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1536 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Wil-
liams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
103 The only exception would be those "works of visual art," which receive an explicit,
but very limited, form of moral rights protection under 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2004).
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protected by section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. However, section
106A was enacted by a Congress that was very much aware of, and
indeed reiterated,0 4 the previous Congress' declaration that no
moral rights legislation was necessary to comply with Article 6bis of
Berne. 105 Thus, Congress seems to have intended section 106A as
an enhancement of existing protections even if its enactment led
to some overlap in protections. 10 6 Moreover, section 106A clearly
protects rights that section 43(a) does not - for example, the right
to prevent certain works of art from being destroyed or damaged,
even by their owners, and the right to prevent objectionable altera-
tions to works even in the absence of a misattribution.10 7 It
preempts equivalent state moral rights protection during the life of
the author, something else that section 43(a) does not do, and
thereby reduces the potential for inconsistent levels of moral rights
protection in different states.108 It also imposes specific require-
ments for giving effect to moral rights waivers, requirements that
are far more rigorous than those that apply to waivers under sec-
tion 43(a).109 It provides for the full array of copyright remedies,
including statutory damages, and thus allows for a recovery of dam-
ages without the showing of actual economic injury (or defen-
dant's unjust enrichment) that is generally necessary to recover
damages under section 43(a). ° In addition, the rights granted to
authors under section 106A do not depend on whether or not a
particular misattribution creates a likelihood of confusion on the
part of consumers; indeed, an author may have a claim under sec-
tion 106A even if the public is fully informed that the attribution is
inaccurate or incomplete, or has no interest in knowing the true
origin of the work. 1
104 See supra text accompanying note 94.
105 See supra notes 68-91 and accompanying text.
106 In enacting VARA, Congress also seems to have focused more on the perceived
shortcomings of Title 17 in light of Berne, rather than on the broader question of whether
the totality of domestic laws satisfied Berne, which it answered affirmatively in 1988. See
H.R. REP. No. 101-514, supra note 94, (noting that "only an artist who retains the copyright
in his or her work is able to invoke Title 17 rights in defense of the integrity of that work,
and then only where a modification amounts to the creation of a derivative work.").
107 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A)-(B) (2004).
108 Id. § 301(f).
109 Id. § 106A(e).
10 Id. §§ 501 (a), 504 (2004) (allowing statutory damages for copyright infringement as
alternative to actual damages and profits); Web Printing Controls Co. v. Oxy-Dry Corp.,
906 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1990) (Lanham Act plaintiff seeking damages must show that con-
sumer confusion caused actual injury); Schutt Mfg. Co. v. Riddell, Inc., 673 F.2d 202 (7th
Cir. 1982) (similar); Caesar's World, Inc. v. Venus Lounge, Inc., 520 F.2d 269 (3d Cir.
1975) (absence of proof of damage to plaintiff or profit by infringer precludes award of
damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117).
111 Section 106A(a) (2) (the attribution right) allows an author to object to the use of his
or her name as the author of the altered work, while section 106A(a) (3) (the integrity
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Furthermore, as discussed in the next section, the alternative
interpretation of section 43 (a) proposed in this Article would elim-
inate even more of the claimed overlap with the VARA. Section
106A grants certain visual artists the affirmative right to receive
credit for their work. 112 This right would not be superfluous if sec-
tion 43(a) were interpreted to prevent reverse passing off only
when it takes the form of affirmatively false or misleading attribu-
tions, and not when the attribution is merely omitted or incom-
plete. Under this interpretation, the types of false attributions that
would be actionable under section 43(a) would include situations
where a defendant affirmatively took credit for a plaintiffs specific
contributions to a work, or affirmatively attributed those contribu-
tions to a third party, but would not include cases where a defen-
dant merely failed to give credit to the plaintiff. Cases of the latter
sort would be actionable, if at all, only under section 106A.
IV. ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS: DISTINGUISHING A FALSE PROVENANCE
FROM AN INCOMPLETE ONE
In spite of the concerns expressed by Justice Scalia, there is
indeed a way to preserve the ability of unfair competition laws to
protect the public against misleading attributions of expressive
works without requiring a detailed provenance for every work em-
bodying ideas or expression. If we assume, for the sake of argu-
ment, that Dastar was correct in stating that section 43(a) applies to
reverse passing off of tangible goods (under a very liberal interpre-
tation of either subsection (a) (1) (A) or (a) (1) (B)),1 3 it is still not
entirely clear that section 43(a) should provide a cause of action
where the "passing off" consists of an omitted or incomplete attri-
bution. In other words, one can argue that an actionably false rep-
resentation about the origin of a plaintiffs goods or services
should involve something more than a mere omission; instead, it
should require an affirmatively false declaration of source.
If a defendant acquires merchandise from a plaintiff, removes
the plaintiffs trademark, and substitutes its own mark, a strong ar-
right) allows an author to object to such an alteration even if his or her name is removed
from the work.
112 Section 106A provides, in relevant part, that:
[T]he author of a work of visual art
(1) shall have the right-
(A) to claim authorship of that work, and
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of
visual art which he or she did not create ....
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1) (2004).
113 See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
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gument can be made that-the defendant is accurately representing
itself as the originator of these particular goods. Although the de-
fendant would not be the sole source of the goods, it would cer-
tainly be one of the sources, and indeed it would be the most
proximate of those sources, since it is the last player in the distribu-
tion chain that has brought the goods to the purchaser. Thus, the
defendant's indication of itself as the origin of the goods would still
be accurate, though not comprehensive, since it leaves out the ear-
lier history of the goods.
The approach proposed here rejects Dastars unwarranted nar-
rowing of the concept of "origin," and allows section 43 (a) to apply
equally to expressive works and tangible merchandise, as well as
services and commercial activities, as it has in the past. Thus, crea-
tive and physical provenances are treated alike. The proposed ap-
proach also avoids the parade of horribles that the Court
envisioned as the unavoidable consequence of applying section
43(a) to expressive works. However, it recognizes that the very
same parade of horribles could easily follow from the Court's ill-
considered assumption that section 43 (a) bars relabeling as to phys-
ical origins.
Rather than impose on merchants an open-ended obligation
to recite the entire creative or physical provenance of goods and
services, the approach proposed here distinguishes between attri-
butions that are affirmatively false or misleading, on the one hand,
and attributions that are merely omitted or incomplete, on the
other. As discussed beloiw, this approach would provide a cause of
action under section 43(a) only in the case of affirmatively false or
misleading representations of origin, whether that origin is creative
or physical. Although there may be occasions where a fine line
separates affirmative misrepresentations from incomplete or omit-
ted attributions, such line-drawing is hardly unfamiliar to courts
evaluating section 43(a) claims, which always turn on the ultimate
questions of whether the public is likely to be confused and
whether that confusion is likely to injure the plaintiff.
This approach begins by rejecting the Court's suggestion that
the source of ideas or expression embodied in a product is irrele-
vant to the product's "origin" for purposes of section 43(a). Every
commodity offered for sale embodies ideas or expression, whether
or not these are eligible for patent, trade secret, or copyright pro-
tection. Even a salt shaker embodies ideas. In some cases, particu-
larly those involving goods with significant expressive, artistic, or
inventive elements, consumers may care a great deal more about
the source of the ideas, information, or inventive or creative ele-
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ments embodied in the good than the source of its physical
manufacture. '14
Instead, this approach refocuses the unfair protection analysis
on the goal of consumer protection, by inquiring what the con-
sumer reasonably believes about a good and whether that belief is
likely to have a material effect on the purchasing decision.' 15 In
some cases, authorship of the idea, expression, or performance
embodied in the commodity may be just such a factor. Certainly,
in the case of literary works or entertainment works, the identity of
the actual author, performer, or creative overseer may frequently
be more crucial to the consumer's purchasing decision, than the
identity of the party that manufactured the physical embodi-
ment."' Like other, more traditional, types of trademarks, the
identity of key creative participants is often viewed as a source indi-
cator that is an important predictor of the quality or content of the
goods. In order for these source indicators to perform their con-
sumer protection function, they must receive the same degree of
protection under the Lanham Act as more traditional trademarks.
Affording this legal parity to indicators of creative source under
the Lanham Act is possible if we treat all affirmatively false or mis-
leading statements of origin as actionable unfair competition,
while providing no cause of action where indications of origin are
merely omitted or incomplete. The proposed rule would therefore
bar application of section 43(a) to reverse passing off claims based
on mere omissions (often referred to as "implied" reverse passing
off), regardless of whether they pertain to the origin of tangible or
114 Even the Court's own example supports this. Although the Court suggests that cus-
tomers do not care to know who invented the Coca-Cola formula, and care only to know
that their beverage was made by the Coca-Cola Company, 539 U.S. at 32, the latter claim is
dubious. Customers care only that the formula in their beverage is the genuine Coca-Cola
formula, and that someone has exercised appropriate quality control over its preparation.
The function of the trademark is to convey this crucial information to the consumer. Con-
sumers do not care who actually mixed or bottled the beverage, any more than they care to
know the name of the person who invented the formula. They just want to know that the
intellectual property embodied in the beverage (the trade secret formula) is "the real
thing." For further discussion of the Court's Coke/Pepsi analogy, see notes 138-41 and
accompanying text.
115 This is the familiar standard used in federal trademark law to determine whether a
misdescriptive mark is "deceptive" and therefore unregistrable under section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2004). See, e.g., In re Cal. Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d
1334, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Budge Mfg. Co., 857 F.2d 773, 775 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The
standard is also used to determine whether a false advertisement is actionable under sec-
tion 43(a)(1)(B). See, e.g., Hickson Corp. v. Northern Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260
(1lth Cir. 2004); Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 299 F.3d
1242, 1247 (l1th Cir. 2002).
116 Justice Scalia acknowledged this in Dastar, but concluded that the consumer's inter-
est in creative provenance outweighed the importance of avoiding overlap between unfair
competition and copyright law. 539 U.S. at 33-34.
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intangible components of a commodity. It would, however, pro-
vide a cause of action under section 43 (a) for any affirmatively false
or misleading indication of origin (that is, "express" reverse pass-
ing off). The same distinction would apply regardless of whether
the misrepresentation (or omission) pertains to the tangible or in-
tangible components of a commodity. Thus, the same standard
would apply to both expressive and non-expressive works.
Moreover, this approach recognizes the absurdity of the
Court's assumption that removing a manufacturer's mark from
goods, and substituting the re-seller's mark, is "undoubtedly" ac-
tionable as a "false designation of origin."117 Merely omitting the
identity of a maker or other upstream supplier is in most cases un-
likely to cause consumer mistake or deception, because consumers
ordinarily do not expect a full provenance on every item they
purchase - and this is equally true whether the provenance in ques-
tion applies to tangible or intangible contributions. Even when a
defendant affirmatively names itself as the source, without identify-
ing upstream contributors, that affirmation may not be false, but
simply incomplete. Thus, replacing the plaintiffs mark with the
defendant's mark does not necessarily cause the public to infer
that the defendant was the only party that contributed to the fin-
ished product.
The relative lack of harm to consumers in the case of omitted
source designations is easily illustrated, even in the case of tangible
origins where the Court thought that section 43(a) should "un-
doubtedly" apply. For example, when Chrysler puts its name on a
car without identifying the source of every component of that car,
it is accurately representing itself as the source of the combination
of components, indeed the most proximate and important source,
and the failure to identify its partners and subcontractors is not
false or misleading, even if Chrysler did not itself manufacture a
single component of the vehicle. If the car fails to perform well,
the consumer will identify Chrysler as the source of the vehicle,
and the consumer will hold Chrysler accountable. The consumer
will not especially care who made the particular component that
failed, and in all likelihood the consumer did not ask the identity
of each component manufacturer at the time he or she bought the
car from Chrysler. Thus, the consumer's buying decision was prob-
ably not influenced by Chrysler's failure to disclose that the compo-
nent makers were unaffiliated with Chrysler. In this example,
section 43(a) would not provide a cause of action, because the de-
117 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31.
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fendant has truthfully identified itself as the party responsible for
offering this particular combination of components to the relevant
marketplace. If the consumer is concerned about the source of a
particular component - the engine, for example - then he or she
would probably inquire at the time of purchase, or look up this
information in the product brochures. If Chrysler (or its author-
ized agent) affirmatively represents that the engine was manufac-
tured by Chrysler, when in fact it was manufactured by Tonka Toys,
then Chrysler has engaged in express, rather than implied, reverse
passing off, and section 43(a) should apply.'11 Mere silence as to
the engine's source, however, should not be actionable, since a rea-
sonable consumer would not expect that Chrysler itself makes
every component of its vehicles. However, the Court's suggestion
that removal of the manufacturer's label would "undoubtedly" vio-
late section 43(a) seems to contradict this common-sense
conclusion.
To use another example, suppose that a customer orders a
sour apple martini at a bar. When the martini arrives, it does not
bear a label indicating the specific brands of schnapps and vodka
that the bartender used.119 Surely the customer does not believe
that the bar itself distilled the schnapps and vodka. Instead, the
customer assumes, without even considering the matter, that the
bar uses various brands of beverages that are made and distributed
by other parties. The customer knows that the bar is the most
proximate source of the martini, because the bar selected the
brands and the bartender is responsible for how the drink was
mixed. Therefore, the customer will accurately blame the bar if
the drink is not prepared well or if the ingredients are of poor
quality. But the customer does not believe that the bar actually
118 The pervasive problem of standing, of course, limits the ability of section 43(a) to
protect consumers even under both the Dastar approach and the approach proposed here.
If Tonka Toys did not care that Chrysler was taking credit for its engines, it would be
unlikely to bring a section 43(a) claim for either express or implied reverse passing off,
and the deception of consumers could conceivably continue. However, Chrysler's compet-
itors would have standing to sue, based on the likelihood of competitive injury, and might
very well be motivated to do so. In this respect, the proposed distinction between express
and implied reverse passing off is subject to the same infirmity as the Dastar approach, an
infirmity that arises because the section 43 (a) standing requirements dictate that consumer
protection be relegated to industry competitors rather than entrusted to the consumers
themselves. To some extent, of course, the consumer protection function is also delegated
to federal administrative agencies.
119 It is unlikely that the makers of these ingredients gave the bar an express license to
omit their origin indicators. There may be an implied license, but such a license might be
implied in virtually any situation where components are purchased from suppliers and
then assembled and distributed under another vendor's name. In fact, it might be more
accurate to say that such a license is implied unless the component maker expressly states a
contrary intent.
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made the individual ingredients. In contrast, if the bar affirmatively
misrepresents the brand of vodka that it is using - perhaps claiming
to use a premium brand but in fact using a cheaper brand - the
customer is being misled. The trademark owner of the premium
brand in this case has a traditional passing off claim.' 2 ° But the
trademark owner of the cheaper brand also has a claim, at least
under the law of most states, for reverse passing off by affirmative
misrepresentation. If the customer likes the cheaper vodka, he or
she will mistakenly think it is the premium brand, and will be more
likely to purchase the premium brand in the future, not realizing
that the enjoyable product in fact originated elsewhere. In con-
trast, if the bar said nothing about the source of the vodka, we
know that the customer assumes it was not distilled by the bar, and
the customer can ask the bar to identify the source if that informa-
tion is important to the customer. No misrepresentation has oc-
curred, and the customer is not confused by the bar's initial
decision to omit the source identification.
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition uses a similar sce-
nario to illustrate a situation in which reverse passing off should
not be recognized:
A operates a restaurant and purchases candies sold by B in
boxes bearing B's trademark. A removes the candies and indi-
vidually wraps them in paper bearing the name of A's restaurant
and serves them to its customers. In the absence of evidence
indicating that the customers are likely to believe that the
candies were manufactured by A, A has not made a representa-
tion likely to deceive or mislead under the rule stated in this
Section.12 1
The same analysis applies if the plaintiff and defendant offer
identical items in the same marketplace. For example, suppose the
defendant buys apples from the plaintiff, relabels them, and then
sells them to the public under the defendant's own label. In that
sense, both the plaintiff and the defendant are sources of the re-
labeled fungible goods. But when a customer purchases one of
these relabeled apples from the defendant, its most proximate ori-
gin is the defendant. If the apple is rotten, who must refund the
customer's money? Certainly not the plaintiff. The defendant is
the source of this apple in the true trademark sense, because the
120 See, e.g., William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924) (holding that
common law passing off occurred where pharmacists dispensed defendant's medication
under plaintiffs brand name).
121 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 5, cmt. b.
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defendant's goodwill stands behind the apple, and its reputation
will be damaged if the apple is bad, and more so if the defendant
refuses to allow an exchange or a refund. The defendant's mark
indicates who is ultimately responsible to the consumer for the quality
of the product. In that sense, it is an accurate representation. The
omission of plaintiffs origin indicator would be actionable if re-
verse passing off applies to omissions, but not if it applies only to
affirmatively false statements. The consumer's interests are pro-
tected even if the plaintiffs trademark is omitted, because a disap-
pointed consumer will look to the defendant for recompense.
Thus, no cause of action for the omitted trademark is needed.
In discussing the common law concept of reverse passing off,
the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition suggests that there is less
potential for commercial injury in the case of reverse passing off
than in the traditional passing off scenario:
Although all forms of passing off involve the creation of confu-
sion with respect to the source of goods or services, the threat of
harm to the commercial interests of others is less immediate in
the case of reverse passing off. Unlike the misrepresentations of
source described in § 4, reverse passing off does not directly
threaten the reputation of another since by definition the mis-
representation acts to sever the actual producer's association
with the goods or services marketed by the actor. Similarly, it
cannot be said that the actual producer is subject to a direct
diversion of trade in the usual sense since it has already sold the
very goods at issue. Reverse passing off, however, may some-
times misrepresent the relative capabilities or accomplishments
of the parties, thus creating the likelihood of a future diversion
of trade to the actor. This Section subjects the actor to liability
only if the actual producer can establish both the fact of a mis-
representation and a likelihood of harm to its commercial
relations.1 2
2
The Restatement's Reporter's Notes distinguish between mere
omission of the maker's mark, and affirmatively false representa-
tions regarding the maker's identity:
The case law does not recognize an affirmative duty on the part
of a seller to disclose the identity of the manufacturer or pro-
ducer of goods offered for sale; liability is imposed only on the
basis of an express or implied misrepresentation that the goods
have been produced by the actor or a third person.
123
122 Id., § 5, cmt. a.
123 Id., § 5, cmt. b, Reporter's Notes (citing Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522 (7th
Cir. 1947) (refusing to recognize an obligation to credit plaintiff as the creator of drawings
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The Dastar approach does not conform to the Restatement ap-
proach, because it does not distinguish between affirmative repre-
sentations and mere omissions. Instead, it distinguishes between
creative and manufacturing provenance, and conclusively
presumes that consumers do not care about creative
provenance. 1 2 4
The approach proposed here is more consistent with the Re-
statement position: The party reselling another manufacturer's
goods would be entitled to omit the maker's source identifier and
substitute its own mark to indicate that the reseller was the proxi-
mate source of the goods, but would not be entitled to represent
itself affirmatively as the manufacturer of those goods, because the
latter would constitute an affirmatively false representation. The
same distinction would apply to both physical and creative prove-
nance. Using the Dastar context as an example, Dastar would be
entitled to omit any reference to Twentieth Century Fox or the
other creative forces behind the film series, and would be entitled
to place its own source identifier on the videocassettes to identify
itself as the proximate source of the products. However, Dastar
would not be entitled to make affirmatively false representations
regarding the identities of the writers, narrators, editors, producers
or other participants who created the work. Thus, Dastar could
identify its own employees who actually worked on the revised and
reissued films, along with the contributions they made or the func-
tions they performed, but it would not be entitled to make or imply
any false statements about their contributions or functions.
Whether Dastar's representations crossed this line is a question for
the trier of fact. Thus, whether representing Dastar and several of
published in defendant's magazine); PIC Design Corp. v. Sterling Precision Corp., 231 F.
Supp. 106, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (declining to impose liability on seller who removed plain-
tiffs name from product purchased through intermediary and resold product in box
marked with its own name, and noting that "[t]o hold otherwise would be to forbid any
repackaging, resale, or reshipment of any item not manufactured by the shipper but sold
under his name."); Commodore Import Corp. v. Hiraoka & Co., 422 F. Supp. 628 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Roho, Inc. v. Marquis, 902 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1990) (use of plaintiff's product as
component of new product sold under defendant's name is not actionable); Shaw v. Lind-
heim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990), on remand, 809 F. Supp. 1393 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (hold-
ing that sale under defendant's name of television script taken in part from plaintiffs work
is not actionable)).
124 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 32-33.
The consumer who buys a branded product does not automatically assume that
the brand-name company is the same entity that came up with the idea for the
product, or designed the product-and typically does not care whether it is.
The words of the Lanham Act should not be stretched to cover matters that are
typically of no consequence to purchasers.
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its employees as "producers" of the videotapes 25 constitutes a false
representation depends on the typical consumer would understand
as the meaning of the term "producer."
Treating mere omissions of source as actionable is especially
problematic in situations where the defendant does not, and can-
not reasonably be expected to ascertain, the identity of prior
sources. Although the defendant in Dastar knew that Fox was the
creator of the public domain series, it is easy to conceive of a case
in which a public domain work is discovered but its creator and the
rest of its provenance are not easily ascertained. The discoverer
who wishes to make this work available to the public, either in its
original form or in an adaptation, should not be expected, on pain
of subsequent liability, to undertake extraordinary efforts to dis-
cover and disclose its provenance as a prerequisite to satisfying the
public's desire for access to the work. By denying a cause of action
for mere omissions, the approach proposed here would avoid bur-
dening parties seeking to make uncopyrighted works available to
the public. Unlike the Dastar approach, it would also guarantee an
equivalent benefit to parties who wish to offer the public products
whose physical manufacturer is unknown. Under Dastar, since the
omission of a known manufacturer would "undoubtedly" be action-
able, it is unclear whether a manufacturer could bring suit for re-
verse passing off against someone who distributed its products
without attribution because the distributor was unable to ascertain
the maker's identity.
The proposed approach would resolve the situation, discussed
earlier, 126 in which a defendant falsely alleges that the plaintiff's
goods are made by someone other than the defendant or the plaintiff-
e.g., Satanists or terrorists. In such a case, the defendant has made
affirmatively false, rather than merely incomplete, representations
about the source of the plaintiff's goods. Thus, when a defendant
offers goods to the public which were manufactured by the plain-
tiff, labeling the goods as originating from the defendant would be
accurate (as in Dastar) because the defendant in fact supplied the
goods to the public. Labeling the goods as originating from the
plaintiff would be accurate if the goods had not been significantly
altered (as they were in Gilliam and King) since leaving the plain-
tiffs control. Labeling them as originating from an intermediary,
such as a distributor, would be accurate if in fact that particular
intermediary was involved in the distribution process. Labeling
125 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 27.
126 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
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them as originating from every component maker or intermediary
who contributed to offering the finished goods to the public could
also be accurate, as long as the label did not imply that a party was
responsible for something other than its actual contribution (as ex-
emplified again by Gilliam and King). However, labeling the goods
as originating from a source that has never had any connection
with those goods would be false and actionable.
If we accept the Court's assumption that the 1988 Congress
did intend to include the pre-1988 reverse passing off cases in the
lines of authority that it codified in the TLRA amendments, the
distinction proposed here between incomplete or omitted prove-
nances and affirmatively false statements of origin finds stronger
support in the relevant legislative history than does the Court's de-
cision to jettison expressive works from the scope of section 43(a).
As noted earlier, 27 both the House Report that accompanied the
BCIA and the Final Report on which Congress relied in enacting the
BCIA confirmed that the pre-1988 version of section 43(a) applied
to "intellectual and artistic works."12 The Final Report also indi-
cated that mere removal of an author's name could be actionable
under section 43(a).129 While the proposed approach does not
adopt that position, it still carries out the BCIA's intent more faith-
fully than does the Dastar approach. 13 1
V. DASTAR's POLICY RATIONALE: NARRowLY DEFINING THE
CONSUMER'S "NEED TO KNOW"
Unfortunately, because the Supreme Court conceded the ap-
plication of section 43(a) to reverse passing off of tangible goods,
the Court was compelled to undertake a tortured and unpersuasive
analysis to justify its holding that the same conclusion should not
apply to intangible goods. It did so largely by relying on an unper-
suasive consumer protection rationale.
In defending its narrow interpretation of section 43(a), the
Court relied on its belief that consumers do not want or need in-
formation about the creative origins of most goods. In the case of
goods, the Court concluded, the consumer is only concerned with
the physical manufacturer of those goods:
127 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
128 Final Report, supra note 71, at 35.
129 Id.; see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
130 Another scholar has taken the even stronger view that the plain language of section
43(a) does not apply to reverse passing off at all; his argument does not distinguish be-
tween merely omitting a source indicator and providing an affirmatively false indicator. See
John T. Cross, Giving Credit Where Credit is Due: Revisiting the Doctrine of Reverse Passing Off in
Trademark Law, 72 WASH. L. REv. 709, 737-42 (1997).
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We think the most natural understanding of the "origin" of
"goods"-the source of wares-is the producer of the tangible
product sold in the marketplace, in this case the physical Cam-
paigns videotape sold by Dastar .... The consumer who buys a
branded product does not automatically assume that the brand-
name company is the same entity that came up with the idea for
the product, or designed the product-and typically does not
care whether it is. The words of the Lanham Act should not be
stretched to cover matters that are typically of no consequence
to consumers.
131
Perhaps the most obvious flaw in this premise arises from the
fact that tangible goods frequently do not bear any indication of
their physical manufacturer, either because they bear only the la-
bel of a licensor, or because they are manufactured by parties who
act at the direction of the manufacturer identified on the label.
Apparel bearing a famous brand label, such as "Ralph Lauren" or
"Liz Claiborne" or "Nike," is typically made by parties who are not
identified on the clothing's label. These labels typically indicate
only the brand name and the country of manufacturer - China,
Mexico, Indonesia, Pakistan, etc. Consumers therefore have no
idea who actually made the goods purchased; they only know that
the brand wants to take the credit (or blame) for the finished
goods. 13 2 Taking the Court's emphasis on physical origins to the
logical extreme, of course, consumers would be entitled to know
the names of the individual workers who cut and sewed their ap-
parel. Consumers typically do not care to know such detail.
The Court acknowledged - with surprising reluctance - that
limiting the "origin" of tangible goods to the physical manufac-
turer of those goods might be too narrow an interpretation of the
term, yet it was unwilling to "stretch" the term beyond the other
responsible parties who licensed, or otherwise authorized, the pro-
duction of the goods:
The concept might be stretched (as it was under the original
version of § 43 (a)) to include not only the actual producer, but
also the trademark owner who commissioned or assumed re-
sponsibility for ("stood behind") production of the physical
product. But as used in the Lanham Act, the phrase "origin of
goods" is in our view incapable of connoting the person or en-
tity that originated the ideas or communications that "goods"
131 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31-33.
132 The same can be said of services in many cases; consumers contract with a service
provider but may not know, or care about, the identity of the individual (or the subcontrac-
tor) who actually delivers the service to them.
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embody or contain. 133
However, by confining the "stretched" concept of "origin"
only to those who "commissioned or assumed responsibility for...
production of the physical product," the Court failed to acknowl-
edge that a party further down the distribution chain might also
have a valid claim to be the "origin" - or at least one of the "ori-
gins" - of the tangible goods in question, even if that party had no
authority whatsoever over the manufacturing process. In other
words, the wholesaler, distributor, repackager, or retailer of goods
might also be considered the "origin" of those goods. Certainly,
when one of those parties puts its trademark on the goods that it
offers for resale, it stands behind those goods in the sense that dis-
satisfied purchasers will look to the owner of that trademark to de-
termine who is accountable for the quality of that product. By
pinpointing the "origin" as the physical manufacturer of the goods,
or the party that authorized their manufacture, the Court not only
ruled out "upstream" parties who contributed ideas or other crea-
tive input that went into the creation of the tangible goods; it also
ruled out "downstream" parties (such as distributors and retailers)
who took responsibility for packaging, handling, and/or ultimately
delivering the tangible goods to the public. Thus, the Court
placed greater emphasis on physical manufacture than either crea-
tive design activities or, packaging and, distribution activities.
The Court also failed to acknowledge the difficulty of applying
its narrow interpretation of "origin" to services and "other com-
mercial activities," both of which receive the same protections as
goods according to sections 43(a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B). Services,
of course, are inherently intangible. Since there is often nothing
physically produced by the party rendering the service, it is difficult
to use the Supreme Court's definition of "origin" to identify the
source of the service. Nonetheless, services are expressly encom-
passed by sections 43(a) (1) (A) and (B). The term "other commer-
cial activities" further suggests Congress' intent to provide these
protections to all forms of commerce. Because Congress used the
same term "origin" to refer to the sources of all three forms of
commerce, canons of construction require the term "origin" to be
given the same meaning in both contexts, absent a clear indication
of congressional intent to the contrary.'1 4 The Supreme Court's
conclusion that the "origin" of goods in section 43(a) (1) (A) refers
only to the manufacturer of the physical goods is therefore difficult
133 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31-32 (footnote omitted).
134 In re Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 479 (1992).
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to reconcile with the statutory language, which recognizes that ser-
vices and other commercial activities have origins as well. How-
ever, Dastar does not offer any clues as to what the Supreme Court
would consider to be the origin of these other important yet typi-
cally intangible types of commerce. 13
5
The problem with applying the Court's concept of "origin" in
the context of services and other commercial activities is particu-
larly relevant where, as in Dastar, the tangible goods in question
clearly derive most of their value from their creative content rather
than from the physical medium in which that content is embed-
ded. In such a case, the physical manufacturer of the goods may
be, from the consumer's perspective, the least significant contribu-
tor to the finished product. 136 Consumers purchased the Cru-
sades/Campaigns videotapes for their creative content, not for the
physical videotapes themselves; otherwise, they would simply have
purchased blank tapes. The creative content of the tapes was actu-
ally the result of creative services performed by someone. Although,
as noted above, the Court failed to acknowledge this, the language
of the Lanham Act recognizes that those services have an origin,
and that the originator of services is entitled to protection under
section 43 (a) to the same degree as the originator of goods. In the
case of these videotapes, the origin of the services and the origin of
the goods are not the same; while Dastar may have made a contri-
bution, so, too, did Fox. Does the fixation (in a tangible medium
of expression) of the creative content produced by those services
cause the services to no longer have an "origin" for purposes of the
Lanham Act? It would hardly seem so. The more appropriate
question to ask is: Does the Lanham Act impose an affirmative re-
quirement that the origin of those services be disclosed? The
Court implicitly held that it did not. Yet, the Court found exactly
such an affirmative obligation to disclose the origin of the physical
goods.1"" Why was the Court concerned with the goods and not
135 It is unfortunate that the Court did not even consider the problem of defining the
origin of services. Services, while themselves intangible, may be physically delivered by a
source that is different from their creative source. For example, a live band typically per-
forms music that was written by others; a radio station always does. Similarly, a carpet
cleaning crew typically uses carpet cleaning methods that were developed by persons other
than (a) the cleaning crew themselves or (b) the owners or managers who dispatch the
crew to the customer's location.
136 Indeed, while Dastar may have edited the tapes, added content, and ultimately made
the physical tapes available to the public, Dastar may not itself have been the physical
manufacturer of these tapes, and thus, under the Court's own interpretation of section
43(a), Dastar might not receive Lanham Act protection against someone who deletes Das-
tar's name and re-sells the tapes.
137 Such an affirmative obligation is rejected by the RESTATEMENT:
The case law does not recognize an affirmative duty on the part of a seller to
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the services that make up the most important part of the goods?
Contrary to the Court's suggestion, if a consumer were to be disap-
pointed in the videotaped entertainment he or she had purchased,
the consumer would not necessarily hold the maker of the physical
videotape responsible. If the consumer disliked the content, he or
she would want to hold the creator of the content responsible. In
contrast, if the consumer found the videotape to be physically de-
fective, he or she would want to hold the physical manufacturer,
wholesaler, or retailer accountable. A similar argument would ap-
ply to almost any tangible product that contains significant intellec-
tual property, such as pharmaceuticals, sound recordings, books,
motion pictures, and videogames and other software.
The Court attempted to address the relationship between in-
tellectual property and the physical products incorporating that
property by drawing an analogy to competing brands of soft drinks,
but its analogy was inapposite. Consumers of soft drinks might, the
Court noted, care whether the soft drink they purchase was actually
manufactured by Coca-Cola rather than Pepsi-Cola; however, they
would probably not care who first invented the formula for that
drink. 118 Thus, the label should correctly identify the physical
manufacturer of the beverage, but need not identify the party re-
sponsible for developing the recipe. On that basis, the Court con-
cluded that a soft drink maker should not be held liable for reverse
passing off under section 43 (a) simply because it fails to list all the
parties that contributed to developing the soft drink formula. In
other words, the Court determined that the source of the intellec-
tual property underlying the drink would not be important to the
consumer, whereas the source of the tangible product itself could
be a significant factor in the buying decision. "The words of the
Lanham Act," the Court concluded, "should not be stretched to
cover matters that are typically of no consequence to
purchasers." 3 9
The Court appears to have confused itself with a misleading
analogy. The Coke/Pepsi analogy fails to recognize that "Pepsi-
Cola" and "Coca-Cola" refer not only to different companies but to
distinctly different products as well. 14 ' The analogy assumes that sec-
tion 43(a) would protect the consumer's interest in cases where the
disclose the identity of the manufacturer or producer of goods offered for sale;
liability is imposed only on the basis of an express or implied misrepresentation
that the goods have been produced by the actor or a third person.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 5, cmt. b, Reporter's Notes (1995).
138 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 32.
139 Id. at 32-33.
140 This author, for one, can tell the difference between a Coke and a Pepsi.
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actual maker of the drink (the Pepsi-Cola company) has not au-
thorized Coca-Cola to relabel Pepsi-Cola's products with the Coca-
Cola label, but that section 43(a) would not protect the consumer's
concern in cases where Coca-Cola's relabeling activity was under-
taken with the consent (express or implied) of the actual manufac-
turer (Pepsi). In other words, the Court would not allow a section
43(a) claim by a soft drink maker that has consented to Coca-
Cola's relabeling of its product, because the maker's consent would
bar the action, and thus the relabeling would not constitute action-
able reverse passing off. Yet the consumer's interest in accurate
information about the source of the product is just as significant
where the relabeling is authorized as where it is unauthorized. The
consumer has no reason to care whether Coca-Cola had permission
to relabel another maker's products as its own. As long as the
drink sold under the Coca-Cola label has the qualities (flavor,
sweetness, fizz factor, caffeine level, absence of tainted or spoiled
ingredients) that consumers have come to expect from the product
they know as Coca-Cola, they are getting what they have bargained
for, even if the drink is physically made by someone else - whether
that someone else is Pepsi or Seagram's or some lesser-known
drink-maker. If the drink disappoints, the consumer will quite
rightly blame Coca-Cola, the downstream labeler who has volunta-
rily applied its own origin identifier to the Pepsi-made product
before offering it to the public. If Coca-Cola were selling a Pepsi
product under the Coke label with Pepsi's permission, Pepsi would
have no cause of action under section 43(a) because the labeling
was authorized by contract. The existence of contractual authori-
zation, however, would have no impact on the consumer, who
would have no more information about the product than if the
relabeling had been done with Pepsi's consent. Thus, a licensed
sale of a third party's product under the Coca-Cola name would be
exactly the same, from a consumer's point of view, as an unlicensed
sale. Coca-Cola would be ultimately responsible for the quality and
characteristics of any product sold under its name, and it would be
answerable to the purchaser if the product were unsatisfactory or
had significantly different characteristics from the product which
Coca-Cola had sold under that same name in past. Coca-Cola
would be free to obtain its product from any supplier it chose, but
it would bear the risk of disappointing consumers if it failed to
maintain the consistency and quality of the product.14 Thus, in
141 It is remotely possible that the Court was led astray by the well-known rivalry and
taste difference between Coke and Pepsi. If a consumer bought a drink labeled Coke and
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this example, Coca-Cola's goodwill is on the line, not Pepsi's. The
consumer views Coca-Cola as the origin of the product, even if
Coke was not the real manufacturer. The consumer is not
deceived, even if Pepsi did not consent to the relabeling, because
the product the consumer received is exactly the product he or she
was expecting to receive - it is the product the consumer knows as
Coca-Cola.
The Court's confusion about its own Coke/Pepsi analogy is
evident if we substitute the name "Drinkmaker X" for the name
"Pepsi." If Coca-Cola buys its familiar syrup from Drinkmaker X,
adds carbonated water, and puts the combination into Coca-Cola
cans and bottles for sale to consumers, then the consumer is get-
ting the exact product that he or she recognizes as Coke. In this
case, then, Coca-Cola's failure to identify Drinkmaker X as the
physical manufacturer of the drink that it sells in its distinctive
Coca-Cola packaging does not cause consumers to be misled, con-
fused, or deceived. Although the Court correctly acknowledged
that consumers might not care who invented the Coca-Cola
formula, the Court was incorrect in asserting that consumers would
care whether the syrup was made by Coke or by Drinkmaker X. In
fact, most consumers probably do not know or care who actually
makes the Coca-Cola product that they drink. They know only that
Coca-Cola stands behind it, so that if they are disappointed they
will be able to hold Coca-Cola accountable.
Thus, section 43(a) does not protect consumers from licensed
reverse passing off (either implied or express), and consumers
have no need of such protection. Whose interests are served, then,
by applying section 43(a) to unlicensed reverse passing off?. Based
on the soft drink example, it is probably not the interest of the
discovered, upon tasting it, that it was in fact a Pepsi, that consumer would certainly feel
deceived as well as disappointed (unless he or she actually prefers Pepsi). However, Coke
could just as easily have disappointed this consumer by changing its formula so that its
drink tasted more like Pepsi. As we all know, Coca-Cola actually did this some years ago,
introducing "New Coke" to the great dismay of its loyal customers. However, the market-
place rendered its verdict, and when consumers let Coca-Cola know of their displeasure,
Coca-Cola responded by abandoning this experiment. (Decades earlier, when Coke gradu-
ally removed the last traces of cocaine from its recipe, there were no howls of protest;
apparently no one could tell the difference.) In contrast, if the same consumer bought a
drink labeled "Coke," and that drink had been made by Pepsi using the Coke formula, that
consumer would not be disappointed, and probably would not feel deceived even after
learning the truth about its origin. Thus, the Court's reliance on the Coke/Pepsi example
may have led it to assume - wrongly - that reverse passing off of a tangible good would
cause a type of injury to consumers that would be absent in the case of reverse passing off
of an intangible good. However, if the Court had used the same example but had assumed
identical beverages with less famous origin indicators, such as Brand X and Brand Y, it
might have seen more clearly that the consumer interest in this situation is not significantly
different from the consumer interest in the scenario involving intangible goods.
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consumer, who is left equally in the dark, and equally unharmed,
in both instances. t4 2 Rather, it appears to be the interest of the
competitor whose product is being relabeled without its consent.
That competitor is missing the opportunity to generate goodwill
through teaching the customer to associate the positive qualities of
the product with the brand name of the party that played the most
significant role in producing that product.
It seems disingenuous, therefore, for the Court to suggest that
public policy requires us to distinguish reverse passing off of tangi-
ble goods from reverse passing off of intangible goods on the
ground that consumers have a legitimate interest in knowing the
"true source" of tangible goods but lack an interest in knowing the
true "source" of intangible goods. Rather, to the extent that public
policy concerns play a role in this decision, the decision whether
and when to provide a remedy for reverse passing off should not
depend on the tangibility of the good, but instead on whether the
competitor's interest in receiving proper "credit" for its contribu-
tions is worth protecting. If the interest is worth protecting then it
should be protected regardless of the tangibility of the goods that
the party produced (just as it should be protected in the case of
intangible "services"). If the interest is not worth protecting - be-
cause, as is typically the case, the relabeler will have to purchase the
maker's goods or services either in the open market at consumer
prices or at the same wholesale price as non-relabeling sellers, thus
ensuring that the maker will receive its normal profit margin for
each of these sales - then claims of reverse passing off should not
be recognized for any good or service, regardless of tangibility. 4 '
Does the maker of the relabeled goods suffer an injury be-
142 This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that courts generally agree that consumers
lack standing to sue under section 43(a). See, e.g., Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 86 F.3d
1379, 1383, 1383n.5 (5th Cir. 1996); see a/soJames S. Wrona, False Advertising and Consumer
Standing under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: Broad Consumer Protection Legislation or a Nar-
row Pro-Competitive Measure, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 1085 (1995) (collecting cases).
143 A post-Dastar case has already applied the Dastar analysis to tangible goods, rejecting
a reverse passing off claim under section 43(a) where the defendant used, without attribu-
tion, a table leg manufactured by the plaintiff as a component of a table, which the defen-
dant showed to prospective customers as a sample of its merchandise. In a well-reasoned
opinion, the district court in Bretford Manufacturing, Inc.. v. Smith System. Manufacturing.
Co., 286 F. Supp. 2d 969, 971-72 (N.D. Ill. 2003), gave two reasons for rejecting the plain-
tiff's claim: First, the sample table was not the actual good offered for sale; it was only a
representation of the good that would be sold. Second, the buyer "was not concerned with
the source of the component parts." Id. Ironically, Bretfords rationale is a distinct depar-
ture from the rationale of the very same pre-1988 "reverse passing off" cases that Dastar
cited as proof that section 43(a) applies to reverse passing off of tangible goods; in most of
the cases on which Dastar relied, courts had found liability for reverse passing off under
section 43(a) where the defendant merely showed the plaintiff's goods to potential custom-
ers as a representation of the defendant's own goods. See supra notes 28-32 and accompany-
ing text.
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cause it does not receive proper "credit" from consumers for the
quality of its goods? Might this injury cause the maker to lose out
on future sales of other goods or services because it has not gener-
ated sufficient goodwill to ensure that consumers will take a chance
on the new, untested offering? While this is possible, it is doubtful.
Even if some relabeling occurs, there is no reason why the maker
cannot compete with the relabeler for recognition in the market-
place. Indeed, in most cases, the maker should be the more effi-
cient competitor since the price the relabeler pays the maker for
the good will not be less than wholesale, and perhaps closer to re-
tail. It would be highly unusual for the relabeler's purchase cost to
be less than the maker's manufacturing cost, unless consumers are
also able to buy the maker's product at the same firesale price.
It is, of course, commonplace for a well-known manufacturer
to serve as the unnamed source for another manufacturer's "house
brand" of goods. The Kenmore line of appliances, for example,
which is sold by Sears Roebuck, is in fact manufactured by at least
three name-brand manufacturers - Whirlpool, Amana, and GE -
who are also direct competitors of Sears in the appliance market.1 44
Sears does not volunteer this information to its customers through
any kind of prominent signage in its stores, brochures, or web
pages. Rather, it puts its own Sears or Kenmore mark on the mer-
chandise, thus arguably engaging in reverse passing off, albeit with
the consent of the manufacturer. Arguably, the consumer is de-
frauded by this transaction since the consumer who has had a neg-
ative experience with Whirlpool, for example, or who wishes to
boycott that company for some reason, will not realize that his or
her effort to avoid purchasing a Whirlpool product by purchasing
Kenmore has failed.
All of these scenarios involve presenting a product to a cus-
tomer under an omitted or misleading label. Neither one, how-
ever, would support a claim of reverse passing off under section
43(a), because the actual maker of the product has either explicitly
or implicitly consented to the relabeling, and the consumers them-
selves generally lack standing to sue under the Lanham Act. 145 Ac-
cordingly, the Court's stated concern for consumers is not a
persuasive rationale for its decision to interpret section 43(a) so as
144 See Appliance Aid, at http://www.applianceaid.com/searscodes.htrnl (last visited Apr.
12, 2005).
145 Colligan v. Activities Club, 442 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir. 1971) (consumers lack stand-
ing to sue under the Lanham Act). See generally Jean Wegman Burns, ConfusedJurisprudence:
False Advertising Under the Lanham Act, 79 B.U. L. REv. 807, 836-39 (1999) (discussing history
of the denial of consumer standing).
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to encourage omission of source indicators of creative sources
while penalizing such omissions in the case of manufacturers.
VI. THE PREEMPTION SPECTRE AND THE UNCERTAIN SCOPE
OF DASTAR *
Even if Dastars consumer-protection rationale is unpersuasive,
the Court did not rely solely on this argument to justify its distinc-
tion between reverse passing off of tangible goods and reverse pass-
ing off of "communicative products." Though conceding that
consumers sometimes do care about the creative origins of expres-
sive goods, 146 the Court held that even in such situations a section
43(a) claim for reverse passing off should be barred, because rec-
ognizing such a claim would permit plaintiffs to assert rights analo-
gous to copyright in works not protected by copyright law.' 47
Relying largely on the field preemption rationales of Sears/
Compco14' and Bonito Boats,'49 the Court concluded that such an
application of section 43(a) would amount to an impermissible
end-run around the Congressionally-determined durational limits
of copyright protection:
Assuming for the sake of argument that Dastar's representation
of itself as the "Producer" of its videos amounted to a represen-
tation that it originated the creative work conveyed by the
videos, allowing a cause of action under § 43(a) for that repre-
sentation would create a species of mutant copyright law that
limits the public's "federal right to 'copy and to use,"' expired
copyrights .... 50
This is indeed a persuasive argument for refusing to recognize
a section 43(a) claim that is based purely on a failure to attribute
the authorship of a once-copyrighted work that has entered the
public domain. However, by limiting this part of its reasoning to
expired copyrights, the Court left open the question whether sec-
tion 43(a) applies to reverse passing off of works that are still copy-
righted, or to expressive works that were never copyrightable. With
146 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33.
147 Id.
148 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964); Compco v. Day-Brite
Lighting, 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
149 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
150 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34 (citations omitted) (citing Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 165). Dura-
tional limits are mandated as well by the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution,
which allows Congress to grant exclusive rights to authors only for "limited times." U.S.
CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205 (2003) (holding that
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 did not exceed Congress' authority under this
clause).
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respect to works in the former category, recognizing an attribution
right under section 43 (a) would not run afoul of any clearly mani-
fested congressional intent to deny an attribution right to copy-
righted works.15' Likewise, with respect to expressive works that
are not copyrightable (for example, works that are insufficiently
original), Congress has not articulated any intent to deny attribu-
tion rights to such works.
Although the Court articulated its new, narrower, interpreta-
tion of the "origin" of goods in the context of reverse passing off
claims, it did not indicate whether that same interpretation should
apply in the context of traditional passing off claims. Based on the
Court's stated rationale - that consumers are not concerned about
the creative origins of products - it would appear that the same
interpretation must apply. If so, then an author will no longer be
able to bring a section 43(a) claim against parties who falsely or
misleadingly attribute a work to that author. In other words, as
discussed below, in the post-Dastar world authors such as Stephen
King and John Grisham may have no federal remedy when they
find their names attached to movies that are unrelated to anything
they have written.
With respect to traditional passing off claims involving copy-
rightable expressive works, federal courts prior to Dastar - includ-
ing the influential Second Circuit - generally agreed that section
151 Since the Dastar opinion was issued, several federal courts have already applied its
holding to works still under copyright. Zyla v. Wadsworth, 360 F.3d 243, 251-52 (Ist Cir.
2004) (applying Dastar to reject a textbook co-author's 43(a) (1) (A) claim where her pub-
lisher, the assignee of the copyright, dropped her name from a later edition that incorpo-
rated some of her revisions to an earlier edition); Keane v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 297 F.
Supp. 2d 921, 935 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (applying Dastar to reject 43(a) claim alleging that
defendant engaged in reverse passing off by appropriating plaintiff's idea and tide for a
talent show called "American Idol"); Carroll v. Kahn, No. 03-CV-0656, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17902, at *15-18 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2003) (applying Dastarto reject 43(a) claim alleg-
ing failure to give author/producer screen credit for his work on a film); Williams v. UMG
Recordings, Inc. 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1183-85 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (applying Dastarto reject
author's 43(a) claim, as well as state unfair competition claim, for misattribution of film
credits, on the ground that "origin of goods" refers only to tangible goods, not author-
ship); MJM Prods. v. Kelley Prods., Inc., No. 03-390-JD, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16783, at *9
n.3 (D.N.H. Sept. 24, 2003) (unpublished table decision) (ruling that Dastar forecloses
Lanham Act claim based on content similarities between film and television series); Boston
Int'l Music, Inc. v. Austin, No. 02-12148-GAO, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16240, at *4-5 (D.
Mass. Sept. 12, 2003) (applying Dastarto reject 43(a) claim based on unauthorized copying
of plaintiff's musical composition). One court has also applied Dastar to bar a section
43(a) reverse passing off claim for misrepresentation of patent ownership. digiGAN, Inc.,
v. iValidate, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 420 (RCC), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1324, at *14-15 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 3, 2004) (holding that a patent is not a "good or service" under the Lanham Act) (also
citing Hans-Jurgen Laube & Oxidwerk HJL AG v. KM Europa Metal AG, No. 96 Civ.
8147(PKL),1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3921, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 1998); Pro-Mold & Tool
Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
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43(a) applied. 15 2 In King and Gilliam, the defendant had affirma-
tively misrepresented the plaintiffs association with an altered ver-
sion of the plaintiffs copyrighted work. However, the Supreme
Court's concern about creating "a species of mutant copyright law"
would argue for overturning these decisions, because they permit
section 43 (a) claims to limit the use of copyrightable works regard-
less of whether the use in question is permitted by the copyright
statutes. 53
If the Court's holding is intended to apply only to reverse pass-
ing off of intangibles, then its statement that the "origin" of
"goods" refers only to the origin of physical goods is overbroad,
since this would also limit the application of section 43(a) to claims
of traditional passing off - that is, claims against a defendant that
offers its goods or services to the public under the plaintiffs name.
In other words, if the "origin" of goods is limited to their physical
origin, then traditional passing off claims under section 43 (a) must
also fail in any case where the defendant has falsely attributed au-
thorship of a work to the plaintiff. Since the defendant has not
falsely claimed that the plaintiff physically manufactured the
goods, only that the plaintiff authored their expressive content, ac-
cording to the Dastar interpretation of section 43(a) the defendant
has not made a false or misleading statement about the "origin" of
those goods.
Traditional passing off claims for expressive - and copyright-
able - works have been recognized under section 43(a) in a series
of cases that were completely ignored in Dastar. In Gilliam,'5 4 the
goods (or, perhaps more accurately, the services) offered by defen-
dant ABC were mutilated performances of the plaintiffs television
shows - the result of unauthorized editing for the purpose of in-
serting commercials. The plaintiff argued that ABC had engaged
in passing off, by falsely designating the Monty Python troupe as
the source of ABC's mutilated programs, in violation of section
152 See, e.g., Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976); Stephen King
v. Innovation Books, Allied Vision, Ltd., New Line Cinema Corp., 976 F.2d 824 (2d. Cir. 1992).
The federal courts had long held section 43(a) applicable to reverse passing off of expres-
sive works as well. See supra text and accompanying notes 33-42.
153 Though section 43(a) claims that allege traditional passing off of copyrighted works
would not constitute an end run around the limited term of copyright, they could circum-
vent other copyright law limitations. For example, while federal courts have exclusive juris-
diction over copyright claims, section 43(a) claims may be brought in either state or
federal courts. More fundamentally, the rule that copyright owners have exclusive rights to
prevent the unauthorized reproduction, distribution, alteration, or public performance or
display of their works, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2004), would be undercut if authors or other crea-
tive contributors could bring section 43(a) claims based on activities that occur after they
have relinquished the copyright in their works.
154 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
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43(a). The Second Circuit agreed, finding that ABC was the true
source of the altered goods, and that ABC had falsely represented
the Python troupe as the source.
1 55
Under the Dastar approach, the Monty Python troupe would
have a section 43(a) claim only if it had been wrongly represented
as the source of physical goods that it did not actually produce.
However, the public that was likely to be confused by a false desig-
nation of origin never received or experienced any physical goods.
Instead, the public received or experienced only the intangible per-
formance that resulted from ABC's use of those goods. Alterna-
tively, one could say that the public received or experienced a
service - entertainment - that was provided by means of those
goods. The essential good or service at issue in that case, there-
fore, was not a tangible good at all, but an intangible performance
of an expressive work.
Understood this way, the decision in Gilliam did not hold that
ABC misidentified the true source of any tangible goods, which the
television viewer did not care about or even receive; rather, the
court held that ABC misidentified the true source of the intangible
performance, which the viewer did care about and did receive.
156
The viewers that found the edited programs disappointing would
blame Monty Python as the designated source of the creative con-
tent; they would be unlikely to blame the broadcaster (ABC), the
manufacturer, or the distributor that merely provided the tangible
tapes to the broadcaster. Indeed, the consumers would be equally
confused if the tapes had been altered by a third party without the
broadcaster's knowledge. Thus, if the facts of Gilliam arose again
today, under the Dastar holding, the Monty Python troupe would
apparently have no section 43(a) claim against ABC for altering
their performance without consent, because they were not falsely
represented as the creators of any tangible goods.
Similarly, in King,'5 7 the Second Circuit found that the defen-
155 Because the plaintiffs had also retained the copyright in their work, and the right to
object to alterations, the Second Circuit also held that the unauthorized editing infringed
their copyright - specifically, the exclusive right to create derivative works under 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(2).
156 Of course, even if ABC had identified itself as a source of the Python troupe's muti-
lated performance, that would not have eliminated the false designation of origin prob-
lem. Omitting the Python troupe's names entirely would have implied that ABC was the
sole creator of the work, which would have been equally false, and possibly actionable as
reverse passing off under state law or the pre-1988 version of section 43(a). Even a dis-
claimer, as the Gilliam majority noted, would not have solved the problem entirely, because
it would not help the consumer to distinguish the troupe's contributions from ABC's con-
tributions. See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 25 n.13.
157 976 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1992).
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dant had falsely designated Stephen King as the source of a film,
which was promoted as Stephen King's Lawnmower Man, even though
the public did not receive or experience this film as a tangible
good. The public experienced only the intangible performance,
which may be viewed as either a service or an intangible "good."
Even customers who rented or purchased a tangible copy of the
film (like a videotape or DVD) would not be misled by this false
possessory credit into thinking that Stephen King was the manufac-
turer of the physical object they acquired. Instead, the false credit
would mislead them into thinking that he was a creative contribu-
tor to the intangible motion picture. In other words, they would
blame King if the movie were bad, but not if the tape broke or the
DVD had a scratch. Thus, the false indication of King as the source
of this film would confuse consumers as to the origin of the most
important aspect of this product - the content of the motion pic-
ture itself.
Post-Dastar, however, King would apparently no longer have a
passing off claim under section 43(a), because the defendant, In-
novation Books, did not falsely represent King as the source of any
tangible goods. The Dastar Court indicated that the consumer
would not care who originated the intangible creative content of
the Crusades episodes; they would only care who originated the tan-
gible goods. However, the consumer who is considering buying or
renting Lawnmower Man might care very much whether Stephen
King was involved in making the film. The consumer would care
about this question as much as, if not more than, the question of
who physically manufactured the video or DVD. Thus, the Dastar
analysis as applied to King is unpersuasive. Yet, if the "origin" of
"goods" has the narrow meaning ascribed to it in Dastar, then fed-
eral law does not protect the consumer from films falsely claiming
to be the work of Stephen King.158
Suppose that a different film company makes a competing,
and better, version of Lawnmower Man, and receives the express
endorsement of Stephen King because their film is more faithful to
his original short story. Does the Lanham Act offer no protection
158 In a recent variation on the problem of artistic passing off as illustrated by Gilliam
and King, film directors raised section 43(a) claims against companies that engage in unau-
thorized editing and distribution of their films, or which distribute software that enables
home viewers to automatically edit out objectionable material from the DVD versions of
those films. To the extent that this lawsuit survives enactment of the Family Entertainment
and Copyright Act of 2005, S. 167, one commentator notes that Dastar could present an
obstacle to those claims. Gail H. Cline, On a ClearPlay, You Can See Whatever: Copyright and
Trademark Issues Arising From Unauthorized Film Editing, 27 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J.
(Comm/Ent) 567 (2005).
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to consumers perusing the DVD rack at their local rental store,
trying to figure out which version is which? Suppose that the unen-
dorsed version is titled Stephen King's Lawnmower Man. How will the
consumer know that Stephen King did not endorse this version?
If, as Dastar holds, the "origin" of "goods" refers only to tangible
goods, then section 43 (a) does not prevent this false endorsement.
Even under the narrowest possible interpretation of Dastar- under
which section 43(a) is inapplicable to expired copyrights - if the
two competing films in this example were in the public domain,
the Lanham Act would fail to protect the consumer against confu-
sion arising from an affirmatively false representation about the or-
igin of each public domain work.
There is one key difference between the Gilliam and King sce-
narios. The plaintiffs in the Gilliam scenario would still have a cop-
yright claim even if their 43(a) claim was rejected under Dastar.
Because the plaintiffs retained significant rights under their licens-
ing agreement, the defendant's alteration of their work involved
unauthorized adaptation under section 106(2) of the Copyright
Act. In contrast, in the King scenario, if the plaintiff were deprived
of his section 43(a) claim, he would have no copyright claim to fall
back on because the defendant had a license to copy, adapt, dis-
tribute, and publicly perform the plaintiffs work.
Ironically, both in traditional passing off scenarios such as Gil-
liam and King, and in reverse passing off scenarios such as Smith v.
Montoro, F.E.L. Publications, or Dastar itself, a plaintiff might be able
to proceed with a claim under state unfair competition laws, which
are almost identical to the Lanham Act, because Dastar's narrow
definition of "origin" in section 43(a) has no binding effect on the
interpretation of state laws.1 59 Dastar did not hold that copyright
law preempts a section 43(a) claim pertaining to intangibles.
Rather, the Court held that when Congress enacted and revised
the Lanham Act it could not have intended to allow the overlap that
would result from applying section 43(a) to works of authorship.
This conclusion pertains to the intent of Congress in enacting and
amending section 43 (a), not its intent in enacting the federal copy-
right laws. Thus, the Dastar decision does not bar state or federal
159 In California, however, where state unfair competition law is closely modeled on
section 43(a), two district court decisions have applied the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Dastar to reject reverse passing off claims based on authorship misattribution. Twentieth
Century Fox Film v. Dastar Corp., No. CV98-07189FMC(EX), 2003 WL 22669587, at *3-5
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2003) (on remand from Supreme Court, rejecting state unfair competi-
tion claim arising from same facts); Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc. 281 F. Supp. 2d
1177, 1183-85 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (applying Dastar to reject state unfair competition claim for
misattribution of film credits).
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courts from interpreting state unfair competition laws broadly
enough to encompass misattribution of copyrighted or copyright-
able works.
Dastar did not address whether federal copyright law would
preempt a state law claim of reverse passing off of creative works.
Therefore, it is not clear whether preemption doctrine precludes
the creators of copyrightable material from bringing claims under
state unfair competition laws when the "origin of goods" test articu-
lated in Dastar has foreclosed their section 43(a) claim.' The Su-
preme Court's concern with allowing unfair competition doctrine
to prolong an author's monopoly even after the expiration of copy-
right echoes the Court's concern in prior cases in which it held
that federal law preempted enforcement of state unfair competi-
tion laws when such enforcement would override the limitations
which Congress has imposed on the federal patent and copyright
monopolies:
An unpatentable article, like an article on which the patent has
expired, is in the public domain and may be made and sold by
whoever chooses to do so . . . "Sharing in the goodwill of an
article unprotected by patent or trade-mark is the exercise of a
right possessed by all-and in the free exercise of which the
consuming public is deeply interested." To allow a State by use
of its law of unfair competition to prevent the copying of an
article which represents too slight an advance to be patented
would be to permit the State to block off from the public some-
thing which federal law has said belongs to the public. The re-
sult would be that while federal law grants only 14 or 17 years'
protection to genuine inventions, States could allow perpetual
protection to articles too lacking in novelty to merit any patent
at all under federal constitutional standards. This would be too
great an encroachment on the federal patent system to be
tolerated.' 61
Furthermore, although Dastar did not involve a question of
federal/state preemption, the opinion expressly relies on the
160 The Supreme Court has on several occasions held that state unfair competition rem-
edies were preempted by federal copyright or patent statutes. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1964) (holding that federal patent law prevented
state from enjoining, or awarding damages for, the copying of an unpatented and un-
copyrighted lamp design, even though the copying could lead to consumer confusion as to
source); see also Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964);
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (holding that state law
prohibiting use of a particular process for copying boat hull designs was preempted by
federal patent and copyright laws).
161 Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 231-32 (quoting Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.,
305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938)) (additional citation omitted).
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Court's preemption jurisprudence to support the conclusion that
Congress could not have intended section 43(a) to provide a rem-
edy for reverse passing off of public domain works. 162 This suggests
that the preemption defense may be highly effective for defendants
accused of reverse passing off of public domain works under state
unfair competition laws.'
CONCLUSION
When the Dastar Court adopted its narrow reading of the term
"origin" in section 43(a), it failed to distinguish between omitted
or incomplete attributions and affirmatively false or misleading at-
tributions. Instead, it accepted both types of "reverse passing off"
as cognizable under section 43 (a), but only with respect to tangible
goods. Moreover, the Court found this cause of action to be cogni-
zable specifically under subsection (a) (1) (A), rather than the false
advertising provisions of subsection (a) (1) (B).164 With no explana-
tion, the Court simply ignored the fact that subsection (a) (1) (A)
speaks only to a defendant's misleading designations of origin with
respect to "his or her" goods. It noted that the 1988 TLRA amend-
ments "made clear that § 43(a) covers origin of production as well
as geographic origin" and that it is "amply inclusive, moreover, of
reverse passing off,"16 without analyzing whether these conclu-
162 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33-34 (citing Sears, Kellogg, and Bonito Boats).
163 However, it also begs the question of which public domain works would support a
preemption defense. The case for preemption under Dastar is strongest in the case of
formerly copyrighted works that have entered the public domain. But would the defense
also be available in the case of works that have never been copyrightable in the first place?
It is quite probable that the Court would reject the preemption doctrine in the case of
some uncopyrightable works, on the theory that where Congress has chosen not to legislate
at all with regard to those works, Congress intended to leave the question of their protec-
tion to the states. See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (holding that fed-
eral copyright law did not preempt state law prohibiting copying of sound recordings prior
to 1972, because federal copyright laws did not extend to sound recordings during those
years). However, there are other classes of works, which Congress intended to place in the
public domain, such as works created by federal employees acting within the scope of their
employment. The Court would almost certainly hold that a state law claim of reverse pass-
ing off of such works would be preempted. Other works, falling between these extremes,
would present more difficult questions - databases, for example.
164 The Court stated that resolution of the case required it to "decide what
§ 43(a) (1) (A) of the Lanham Act means by the 'origin' of 'goods.'" 539 U.S. at 31. It
added that if a party who made a video
that substantially copied the Crusade series were, in advertising or promotion,
to give purchasers the impression that the video was quite different from that
series, then one or more of the respondents might have a cause of action-not
for reverse passing off under the 'confusion . . . as to the origin' provision of
§ 43(a)(1)(A), but for misrepresentation under the 'misrepresents the nature,
characteristics [or] qualities' provision of § 43(a) (1) (B).
Id. at 38.
165 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 30.
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sions, if correct, should apply to both parts of section 43(a) (1) or
merely to the false advertising provisions.
Once the Court had accepted the questionable premise that
section 43(a) (1) (A) applies to claims of reverse passing off that are
based on incomplete designations of origin, in order to justify its
conclusion that expressive works such as Fox's television series
were not entitled to this protection, the Court found itself com-
pelled to undertake a tortured and ultimately unpersuasive analysis
to distinguish the protections available to producers of tangible
works from those available to producers of expressive works.
In addition, when the Court strayed down this path, its reason-
ing cast doubt on some previously uncontroversial precedents that
had given authors a remedy for traditional passing off. It also con-
flicted with repeated indications of congressional intent regarding
the use of section 43(a) to comply with the United States' obliga-
tions under the Berne Convention. Had the Court simply drawn a
distinction between false attributions and omitted or incomplete
attributions, the first of these troubling ramifications could easily
have been avoided, 66 and the second would have been signifi-
cantly mitigated.
Thus, section 43(a) in its current form need not be read to
encompass all claims of reverse passing off, even those involving
tangible goods which the Dastar Court so casually endorsed. If sec-
tion 43(a) includes reverse passing off at all, it should encompass
only affirmatively false or misleading attributions, while disallowing
claims for merely incomplete or omitted attributions. Such an in-
166 There is no such thing as a traditional passing off claim for omitting an origin identi-
fier. Traditional passing off always involves an affirmatively false or misleading indication
of origin. There are occasions, however, where an origin indicator might be partially accu-
rate but also partially misleading. This is true in both the Gilliam and King cases, where to
some degree the work originated with the attributed source, but the attribution overstates
the extent of the source's creative involvement. These were not cases of omitted or incom-
plete attribution, however; they were cases of affirmatively misleading (though not com-
pletely false) attributions. Thus, the "Stephen King's Lawnmower Man" attribution was
misleading because it overstated King's involvement, not because it omitted the identities
of other creative participants. See King, 976 F.2d at 829. In contrast, the "based upon"
credit, which indicated that the film was based on a story by Stephen King, was accurate
and not misleading, because it did not overstate King's role in making the film. Id. at 829-
31. The actionable aspect of the misleading possessive credit could have been eliminated
(as, indeed, the court's injunction ordered) simply by removing the possessory credit en-
tirely, leaving only the far more accurate "based upon" credit; the likelihood of confusion
could thereby be eliminated without imposing any affirmative obligation on the part of the
film's producer or distributor to identify the other parties who contributed to the creative
aspects of the film. Thus, in the case of traditional passing off, there is no need to distin-
guish omitted or incomplete attributions; all false or misleading attributions are affirmative
in nature, and should therefore be cognizable under section 43(a) based on the approach
proposed in this Article. In other words, the distinction proposed here for reverse passing
off claims already exists in the case law for traditional passing off claims; unfortunately,
Dasta,'s narrow interpretation of section 43(a) threatens to overturn this settled doctrine.
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terpretation of section 43 (a) would obviate any need for the unper-
suasive distinction that the Supreme Court attempted to draw
between tangible and intangible goods, and the resulting uncer-
tainty regarding services and other commercial activities. It would
preserve the right of authors with strong name recognition to pro-
tect their valuable trademarks against unscrupulous marketers who
might falsely attach these authors' names to inferior expressive
works. At the same time, however, it would accomplish the result
intended by the Dastar Court, freeing users of public domain works
from any obligation to provide the public with detailed pedigrees
for those works.
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